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RIGHT ON TIME: FIRST POSSESSION IN PROPERTY AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
DOTAN OLIAR & JAMES Y. STERN 
ABSTRACT 
How should we allocate property rights in unowned tangible and intangible 
resources? This Article develops a model of original acquisition that draws 
together common law doctrines of first possession with original acquisition 
doctrines in patent, copyright, and trademark law. The common denominator is 
time: in each context, doctrine involves a trade-off between assigning 
entitlements to resources earlier or later in the process of their development and 
use. Early awards risk granting exclusivity to parties who may not be capable 
of putting resources to their best use. Late awards prolong contests for 
ownership, which may generate waste or discourage acquisition efforts in the 
first place. While the doctrinal resolution of these timing questions varies in 
different resource contexts, the determination depends upon a recurring and 
discrete set of functional considerations. This Article applies its theory to assess 
a host of doctrinal features in our patent, copyright, and trademark laws, to 
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INTRODUCTION 
Time is central to intellectual property (“IP”) law. Congress, courts, and 
scholars rightfully give considerable attention to questions about when IP rights 
should end,1 but there is comparatively little analysis of when they should begin. 
While ownership of IP rights might be expected to start at original acquisition 
through creation2 or use,3 matters are not quite so simple. 
The foundation of ownership is first possession. Though some treat this as a 
normative or philosophical proposition,4 this Article means it in a positive, 
practical sense. Ordinarily, someone comes to own something by acquiring title 
from someone else who owned it, who acquired title from someone else who 
owned it before that, and so on, until one gets back to the very first owner and 
the so-called “root” of title.5 But how did the first owner come to own it? How, 
in other words, do things come to be owned?6 The basic answer property law 
gives is first possession: ownership of an unowned resource goes to whomever 
does something referred to as “possessing” it before anyone else.7 
 
1 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (empowering Congress to secure IP rights that last for 
“limited [t]imes”); 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012) (defining “abandoned” trademark as among other 
things, when mark becomes a generic name for goods it designates); 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) 
(2012) (stating that copyrights of individual authors generally expire seventy years after 
author’s death); 35 U.S.C. § 154(2) (2012) (stating that patents generally expire twenty years 
after they are applied for); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 189 (2003) (upholding 
constitutionality of copyright term after it was extended by twenty years against arguable 
violation of “limited [t]imes” clause); WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND 
WELFARE: A THEORETICAL TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 76-80 (1969) (providing 
canonical theoretical framework for setting optimal patent term). 
2 See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (stating that copyrights are generally granted to whoever fixes 
original work of authorship in physical object); 35 U.S.C. § 101 (stating that patents are 
generally granted to whoever invents any new and useful invention). 
3 Trademarks have long been awarded to whoever was the first to merely adopt and use a 
mark in commerce. See Hydro-Dynamics, Inc. v. George Putnam & Co., 811 F.2d 1470, 1473 
(Fed. Cir. 1987) (“The requirements of both adoption and use devolve from the common law; 
trademark rights in the United States are acquired by such adoption and use . . . .”); see also 
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (defining “use in commerce” as “bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary 
course of trade”). 
4 See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 306 (Peter Laslett ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1960) (1690) (“He that is nourished by the Acorns he pickt up under 
an Oak, or the Apples he gathered from the Trees in the Wood, has certainly appropriated 
them to himself. . . . I ask then, When did they begin to be his? . . . And ‘tis plain, if the first 
gathering made them not his, nothing else could.”). 
5 See Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 73 
(1985). 
6 See id. (theorizing why certain actions, namely possession, allow one to obtain ownership 
of things). 
7 See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *3 (noting that “whoever was in 
occupation of any determinate spot of [ground] . . . acquired for the time a sort of ownership”); 
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Modern readers may be tempted to dismiss first possession as an essentially 
antiquarian topic, given that so much of the tangible substance of the planet is 
already owned, but the temptation should be resisted.8 There are a number of 
reasons why an understanding of first possession remains valuable, and this 
Article concentrates on one of particular significance: first possession is the 
principal device used to award exclusive rights to the products of human 
imagination and ingenuity—that is, in the field of intellectual property.9 This is 
no small matter. In recent years, more than one million new IP rights have been 
registered with the U.S. government annually, reflecting claims to everything 
from pharmaceutical drugs to pop songs and from product logos to computer 
code,10 and many more have been created but not registered.11 Information is the 
most valuable resource of our age and the yet-to-be-owned expanses of human 
creativity are seemingly endless. Attention to the rules allocating IP rights 
remains critical. 
Are we doing a good job propertizing creations of the mind? Do existing laws 
and doctrines tend to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,” the 
constitutional aim of U.S. patent and copyright laws?12 Or can these rules be 
 
Dean Lueck, First Possession, in 2 NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 
132, 133-36 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) (describing first possession as rule which “grants an 
ownership claim to the party that gains control before other potential claimants”). 
8 The 1890 Census declared that the frontier region of the United States no longer existed. 
See FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER, THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 1 (1920) (“[A]t 
present the unsettled area has been broken into by isolate bodies of settlement that there can 
hardly be said to be a frontier line.”); Thomas W. Merrill, Accession and Original Ownership, 
1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 459, 460 (2009) (suggesting principles of accession are primary 
mechanism by which original title to property is established). 
9 Cf. JOHN F. KENNEDY, “LET THE WORD GO FORTH”: THE SPEECHES, STATEMENTS, AND 
WRITING OF JOHN F. KENNEDY 101 (Theodore C. Sorensen ed., 1988) (declaring “New 
Frontier” beyond which “are the uncharted areas of science and space”). 
10 For example, more than three hundred thousand patents were issued, and three hundred 
thousand trademarks and four hundred thousand copyrights were registered in 2016, the last 
year for which all statistics are available. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, FISCAL 2016 ANNUAL 
REPORT 16 (2016), https://www.copyright.gov/reports/annual/2016/ar2016.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/4XUA-C5YC] (stating that 414,269 copyrights were registered in 2016); U.S. PATENT & 
TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 178, 193 (2016), 
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/USPTOFY16PAR.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/GF8M-A77D] (stating that 334,107 patents were issued in 2016 and that 309,188 trademarks 
were registered). 
11 Copyrights and trademarks do not require registration as a prerequisite for their validity, 
which depends only on fixation of an original work in a physical object or on the use of a 
distinctive mark in commerce, respectively. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012); 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1052(f) (2012). 
12 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property 
Clause: Promotion of Progress as a Limitation on Congress’s Intellectual Property Power, 
94 GEO. L.J. 1771, 1845 (2006) (arguing that promotion of progress is not merely preambular 
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improved to better advance knowledge and human welfare? As the major 
frontiers left for the human race to conquer increasingly become intangible, a 
thorough understanding of the principles of first possession can help us perfect 
our management of this legal frontier by implementing the lessons from the 
common law’s long experience with the award of rights in physical resources. 
This is particularly so in light of the special challenges that intangible resources 
present. However difficult the concept of possession may sometimes be to apply 
to physical goods,13 it is immensely more complicated for “things” that exist 
only in the mind’s eye. Custom and intuition provide less reliable safety nets, 
making a good theoretical grip on the concept of possession particularly 
valuable. 
What, then, counts as first possession under traditional legal principles? For 
centuries, the common law wrestled with the concept of possession and the 
problem of defining those actions sufficient to confer rights in things that are 
unowned.14 The rule of first possession was applied across a broad swath of 
resources, and the specific conduct qualifying as possession varied with the 
nature of the resource.15 Behavior as diverse as the snaring or killing of a wild 
animal,16 diverting a stream of water to farmland,17 digging above a mineral 
 
statement of purpose, but rather constitutional limitation subject to deferential standard of 
review). 
13 See, e.g., Popov v. Hayashi, No. 400545, 2002 WL 31833731, at *1, *2 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
Dec. 18, 2002) (determining owner of historic home run ball when one individual had actual 
possession, while another made substantial steps towards possession before being illegally 
interfered with by a third party in his attempt). 
14 See Rose, supra note 5, at 73 (“The law tells us what steps we must follow to obtain 
ownership of things, but we need a theory that tells us why these steps should do the job.”). 
15 John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 447 
(2004) (noting that although “rule-of-capture” is applied to both mining and patent claims, 
application of rule varies with each subject). 
16 See Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175, 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (holding that possession of 
wild animal required capturing or mortally wounding it, rather than simply giving chase); 
DALE D. GOBLE & ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, WILDLIFE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 98-100 (2002) 
(describing early notions of property rights in hunting and capturing “beasts of the forest”). 
17 See, e.g., Eddy v. Simpson, 3 Cal. 249, 251-52 (1853) (holding first possession of water 
not to be possession of fluid itself, but rather its use). 
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deposit,18 and viewing a sunken ship at the bottom of the ocean with a 
submersible camera19 have been treated as acts of possession.20 
As varied and idiosyncratic as these different actions may seem, patterns can 
nevertheless be discerned. One of the clearest ways to make sense of the seeming 
hodgepodge of possessory rules is to think about them in terms of a common 
metric: time. Each of these possessory practices can usefully be placed on a 
chronology starting with the first preliminary steps necessary to appropriate the 
resource at issue and ending when the resource is consumed, commercialized, 
or otherwise put to use.21 The common law has tended to embrace either of two 
approaches to first possession within the context of this chronology. One 
recognizes an exclusive claim upon a resource when a claimant has undertaken 
substantial investments and remains in hot pursuit—what this Article calls a 
first-committed-searcher rule.22 The other approach withholds any protection 
until a claimant has somehow changed the resource in such a way that the 
claimant is able to control and use it—what this Article calls a rule of capture.23 
This distinction between first possession rules in physical resources is key to 
understanding original acquisition rules in IP law. 
We begin by exploring the relative advantages and disadvantages of these 
approaches in their application to tangible goods, setting out a framework to 
analyze first possession questions. Prior scholarship noted many of the issues 
 
18 See Union Oil Co. v. Smith, 249 U.S. 337, 346-48 (1919) (holding that while one 
permissibly explores public lands for minerals, one has substantial interest in any minerals as 
long as one puts forth persistent and diligent effort in ones prospecting). 
19 See Columbus-America Discovery Grp. v. Atl. Mut. Ins., 974 F.2d 450, 465 (4th Cir. 
1992) (holding that viewing sunken ship with submersible camera was sufficient to create 
possessory interest in ship). 
20 See Richard A. Epstein, The Allocation of the Commons: Parking on Public Roads, 31 
J. LEGAL STUD. 515, 515 (2002) (analyzing how different systems of allocation in parking, 
including possession of spaces, metered parking, and parking permits, effect formation and 
transformation of property rights in parking spaces); Gregg W. Kettles, Formal Versus 
Informal Allocation of Land in a Commons: The Case of the Macarthur Park Sidewalk 
Vendors, 16 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 49, 72-73 (2006) (discussing practices allocating 
sidewalk spots to street vendors in Los Angeles). 
21 See Arun S. Subramanian, Assessing the Rights of IRU Holders in Uncertain Times, 103 
COLUM. L. REV. 2094, 2102-04 (2003) (asserting that most modern commentators view rights 
of use, possession, and disposition as essential to establishing property rights); see also 26 
U.S.C. § 7701(e)(1)(B) (2012) (identifying transfer of control as indicative of lease transfer); 
Property, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining property as right to possess, 
use, and enjoy). Property has been defined as requiring “control over [an] item and an intent 
to control it or to exclude others from it.” ROGER BERNHARDT & ANN M. BURKHART, REAL 
PROPERTY IN A NUTSHELL 4 (7th ed. 2016). 
22 See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 17 (2003). 
23 See Lueck, supra note 7, at 135 (describing actual capture as “capturing or ‘reducing to 
possession’ a flow from the asset”). 
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that first possession rules present, but does so in a fragmented and often 
unidirectional manner, with some commentators stressing the problems we 
attribute to later awards and others stressing the problems we associate with 
earlier ones.24 What is missing is a comprehensive overview of the 
considerations at play and an understanding of how these concerns relate to one 
another and to the structure of first possession. 
The essential tradeoff this Article identifies is as follows. On the one hand, 
when exclusive rights vest early in the process of ultimate appropriation and use, 
there is a risk those rights will be awarded to a party who will ultimately fail to 
capture and use the resource.25 On the other hand, when exclusive rights vest 
late in the process, there is the danger either of a longer period of potentially 
wasteful investment by parties competing to own the resource26 or of potential 
capturers opting to stay home because of the risk of losing investments prior to 
capture—especially to free-riders profiting from the work they have done.27 At 
its core, first possession presents an ever-present tension between two recurring 
sets of opposing concerns, one of which counsels in favor of earlier awards and 
the other in favor of later ones. That tension does not necessarily result in a 
stalemate, however, and its proper resolution in one context does not entail a 
single solution to problems in all others. In different areas, the optimal timing of 
an award of property rights is a function of the relative strength of these 
countervailing concerns. 
Elaborating on this tradeoff, this Article develops a framework to analyze and 
evaluate the rules that govern the award of IP rights. In different areas within 
our patent, copyright, and trademark systems, legal doctrine uses variants of the 
two conceptions of the first possession rule to determine when exclusive rights 
 
24 See supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text (discussing articles and cases that dealt 
with some of respective problems with late and early rewards of possession). 
25 See Columbia Motor Car Co. v. C. A. Duerr & Co., 184 F. 893, 904-11 (2d Cir. 1911) 
(discussing controversial Selden patent, where Selden was awarded automobile patent before 
Henry Ford, but court held that Ford did not infringe on patent due to Selden’s inferior 
combination of automobile components and alleged lack of advancement of automobile 
industry); U.S. Patent No. 549,160 (filed May 8, 1879). Other potential drawbacks of early 
awards include the creation of incentives to carry out actions that are not ultimately necessary 
to the ultimate deployment of the resource. 
26 Yoram Barzel, Optimal Timing of Innovations, 50 REV. ECON. & STAT. 348, 348-49 
(1968) (recognizing that “competition between potential innovators to obtain priority 
rights . . . from innovations can result in premature applications of discoveries”). 
27 Cf. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 
265, 266 (1977) (viewing system which follows prospect theory of patents as set of 
opportunities to pursue technological advances with associated set of probabilistic costs and 
returns). Other potential costs include overinvestment in other aspects of the claiming process, 
such as by inefficiently accelerating the process of development, as well as what might be 
called anticompetitive behavior like secrecy and sabotage. See infra Part I (discussing first 
possession rule). 
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are established and who among competing claimants should receive them. One 
of the lessons that emerges from the study of IP doctrine is the dual function that 
first possession rules play. Most obviously, first possession serves to resolve 
disputes among rival contenders for exclusive rights in the same resource. But 
first possession also sets the conditions for the acquisition of exclusive rights as 
such, establishing what a person must do for exclusive rights to vest, whether in 
tangible property or intellectual property.28  
The picture that emerges is complex, but modeling the rules governing the 
award of IP rights in terms of first possession helps us understand those rules 
and their implications more clearly. For example, many of the reforms 
undertaken in response to what are thought to be abuses by so-called “patent 
trolls” reflect an attempt to push the award of patent rights later in time.29 This 
suggests, on the one hand, that the patent troll problem is connected with early 
awards of patent rights, and on the other hand, that policymakers should be 
vigilant to ensure that the benefits of delaying the award of rights are compared 
against the full range of the costs associated with later awards cataloged in the 
discussion that follows. 
Analogizing intellectual property to property is not free from difficulty,30 and 
the limits of our approach should be understood. The conceptual structure 
borrowed from traditional property law can illuminate principles at work in IP 
law. At the same time, however, the notion of intellectal property is an analogy, 
not necessarily an identity. What this Article wishes to highlight here are 
fundamental similarities with respect to the theory and doctrines of original 
acquisition. This does not deny substantial theoretical and doctrinal differences 
between property and intellectual property.  
Modeling intellectual property with a possessory framework must be done 
with sensitivity to differences in context. In the IP arena, concerns over notice 
and information are much more pronounced than they are with respect to 
tangible resources. Often, such concerns can be substantially mitigated through 
the creation of registries and other notice mechanisms, and once in place, such 
institutional devices may facilitate a more flexible approach to original 
acquisition than might otherwise be feasible. The rules can more closely track 
the idealized trade-off that shapes first possession doctrine, but they are also 
more fluid because the nature of the claimable resources themselves is more up-
for-grabs. Not surprisingly, IP doctrine entails greater variation in the rules that 
 
28 See infra notes 39-49 and accompanying text (reviewing criteria under which one may 
gain exclusive rights through first possession). 
29 See infra Part III.A.1. 
30 Compare Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. 
L. REV. 1031, 1032 (2005) (resisting notion that property law provides proper conceptual 
framework for directing our thinking about IP law), with Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual 
Property Is Still Property, 13 HARV. J.L. PUB. POL’Y 108, 118 (1990) (suggesting there is no 
conceptual difference between tangible and intellectual property). 
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set the time of a right’s award than does common-law property.31 There are also 
many instances in which IP doctrine changed the specific time at which 
exclusive rights can be acquired. Sometimes, doctrinal change pushed that time 
of acquisition earlier, such as in the case of intent to use applications in 
trademark law, but other times later in time, such as in the case of the America 
Invents Act. This variation, this Article suggests, has to do with the more 
frequent changes in the relative costs and benefits of awarding rights earlier and 
later in time, and of providing notice and administering exclusive rights in 
information, in the dynamic market settings in which IP rights operate. 
This Article is not the first academic work to explore the practical effects of 
first possession rules,32 but it is the first to develop a comprehensive account of 
the major considerations that shape the doctrinal form of first possession and to 
describe the design of first possession rules in terms of a consistent set of policy 
tradeoffs between early and late awards of rights. Neither is this Article the first 
to suggest parallels between IP doctrines and first possession33 or to raise 
questions about the timing of the award of IP rights.34 It is, however, the first to 
 
31 E.g., Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 329 (2011) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.) (amending time in which patents 
expire). 
32 The leading article is Dean Lueck, The Rule of First Possession and the Design of the 
Law, 38 J.L. & ECON. 393, 430-31 (1995) (observing effects of first possession rules on variety 
of legal fields). 
33 See Abraham Drassinower, Capturing Ideas: Copyright and the Law of First 
Possession, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 191, 191 (2006) (analogizing originality requirement in 
copyright law to first possession requirement in property); Timothy R. Holbrook, Equivalency 
and Patent Law’s Possession Paradox, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 4 (2009) (discussing 
similarities and differences between patent and property law in applying principles of actual 
and constructive possession); Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Anticipation and Obviousness as 
Possession, 65 EMORY L.J. 987, 1035 (2016) (drawing parallel between enablement in patent 
law and possession in property); Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU 
L. REV. 123, 175 (2006) (arguing that enablement is best means to demonstrate property-like 
possession in patent law); Lisa Larrimore Oullette, Pierson, Peer Review, and Patent Law, 69 
VAND. L. REV. 1825, 1826 (2016) (comparing grant of possession in Pierson to more causal 
standard applied in patent law which favors early chasers who put in little effort); Alfred C. 
Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517, 
531 (1990) (outlining “basic copyright doctrines of originality and the idea/expression 
dichotomy and then comparing them to the natural law of property through labor and 
possession”). 
34 See, e.g., Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law, 61 HASTINGS 
L.J. 65, 70 (2009) (criticizing legal incentives to file for patents early); Paul R. Gugliuzza, 
Early Filing and Functional Claiming, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1223, 1227 (2016) (noting 
complexities and variables in determining optimal timing of patent issuance); Kitch, supra 
note 27, at 285 (considering how awarding patents based on priority induces inefficiency in 
early invention); Mark A. Lemley, Ready for Patenting, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1171, 1186 (2016) 
(noting problems with early filing on patent issuance). 
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undertake a systematic examination of first possession in IP law and to explicate 
the similarities, and differences, in the functional considerations that underlie 
first possession doctrines in physical property and across the three major areas 
of IP law: patent, copyright, and trademark. 
This Article proceeds in three stages. Part I outlines the role of first possession 
doctrines in property law, pointing out differences in the way first possession is 
approached in different contexts and discussing reasons for these differences. It 
advances a general framework of original acquisition to guide inquiries into the 
timing of property awards built around the characteristic tradeoffs that early and 
late awards entail. Part II turns to intellectual property. It examines patent, 
trademark, and copyright law to show how a variety of doctrines work together 
in each of these fields to establish what is in effect a system based on original 
acquisition. It points out ways in which the same core concerns first possession 
rules present in the realm of tangible property illuminate the approach to the 
award of IP rights. Part III steps back to engage in a more critical analysis, noting 
ways in which existing doctrine gets things right and others in which it does not. 
This Article concludes by considering the major themes that emerge from 
considering the original acquisition concept as it plays out in the domain of 
intellectual property, identifying lessons for both property and IP law. 
I. FIRST POSSESSION: FORMS AND FUNCTIONS 
First possession is a bedrock principle of property law. Property regimes have 
developed possessory claiming rules for the allocation of rights in all manner of 
resources, ranging quite literally from diamonds35 to dung.36 Yet despite a 
seemingly unitary doctrinal construct, important differences remain in the way 
possession rules operate in different contexts. The key variable is time. Imagine 
a chronology that begins with the first actions a person may take having any 
relationship to a resource, like simply becoming aware of its existence or 
forming an intent to use it. The timeline then proceeds through the various 
actions necessary for a person to derive a benefit from the resource: preparations 
for its pursuit; pursuit itself; the successful completion of pursuit by bringing the 
resource within one’s control; cultivation and improvement to enable beneficial 
use; and finally actual use, enjoyment, consumption of the resource, or its 
transfer to another. 
In theory, property law could have picked any point along this temporal 
continuum as the one at which property rights vest. In practice, property law 
essentially limited its choices to two. In some contexts, property law has deemed 
“possession” to be satisfied at a comparatively early point in time. Under this 
approach, possession occurs when a person has undertaken significant steps 
toward the resource’s appropriation and use, even though actual control has not 
yet been achieved. This Articles calls this variant of first possession a “first-
 
35 See Armory v. Delamirie (1722) 93 Eng. Rep. 664, 664 (KB). 
36 Haslem v. Lockwood, 37 Conn. 500, 500 (1871). 
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committed-searcher rule.”37 Alternatively, and more commonly, property law 
has deemed possession to be satisfied at a later point in time. Under this 
approach, possession occurs only after a person has obtained control over the 
resource. This Articles calls this variant of first possession a “rule of capture.”38 
These are very much ideal types, but they roughly represent two notional points 
around which property law’s first possession doctrines tend to coalesce. 
The property canon offers clear illustrations of each approach. Consider 
Pierson v. Post,39 a staple of first-year American property law curricula. The 
case involved a hunter, Post, who chased a wild fox for some period of time, 
only to lose the animal to a farmer, Pierson, who suddenly appeared on the scene 
and quickly killed it.40 The hunter sued the farmer to recover the value of the 
animal’s pelt, but the court sided with the farmer.41 The dissent argued that it 
was enough to claim a wild animal if “the pursuer be within reach, or have a 
reasonable prospect . . . of taking” it.42 In our terms, it advocated awarding the 
fox to the first committed searcher. The majority, however, rejected this course, 
holding that “pursuit alone vests no property or right in the huntsman.”43 In the 
majority’s view, possession of wild animals required either “actual bodily 
seizure” or having otherwise “wounded, circumvented or ensnared them, so as 
to deprive them of their natural liberty, and subject them to the control of their 
pursuer.”44 The majority, in other words, held that first possession of foxes 
would be satisfied only by the rule of capture. 
A similar distinction can also be seen in the practices described in Professor 
Robert Ellickson’s seminal study of nineteenth century whalers.45 The usual rule 
among whalers was analogous to the rule of capture adopted in Pierson v. Post: 
A whaler establishes possession only after successfully lancing a whale with a 
harpoon tethered and secured to the whaler’s boat.46 The whale, in other words, 
had to be brought under submission. This norm, known as the “fast-fish-loose-
 
37 See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 22, at 17 (stating that property law gives “first 
committed searcher the exclusive right to conduct the search operation”). 
38 See GOBLE & FREYFOGLE, supra note 16, at 98-99 (describing rule of capture based on 
historical development through allocation of rights over wildlife). 
39 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805). 
40 Id. at 175. 
41 Id. at 177-80. 
42 Id. at 182 (Livingston, J., dissenting). 
43 Id. at 177 (majority opinion). 
44 Id. at 177-79. 
45 See Robert C. Ellickson, A Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms: Evidence from the 
Whaling Industry, 5 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83, 88-94 (1989) (discussing different property regime 
norms in whaling industry). 
46 See id. at 89-90 (“[The] rule was in practice likely to reward the first harpooner, who 
had performed the hardest part of the hunt, as opposed to free riders waiting in the wings.”); 
see also HERMAN MELVILLE, MOBY-DICK 305-06 (First Avenue 2014) (1851). 
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fish” rule, reflects a rule of capture approach to first possession of whales. But 
some fisheries followed a first-committed-searcher approach. In waters 
inhabited by the more aggressive sperm whale, custom granted an exclusive 
claim to the first to lance a whale and mark its body with a harpoon, regardless 
of whether the harpoon remained connected to the whaler’s vessel, so long as 
the whaler remained in active pursuit.47 In other words, a whaler could acquire 
a claim to a whale at a stage prior to actual capture by making substantial 
progress toward capture and demonstrating a commitment to following 
through.48 This norm, known as the “iron-holds-the-whale” rule, reflects a first-
committed-searcher approach to the first possession of whales.49 
The cases dealing with first possession suggest a recurring set of competing 
practical considerations, some of which push for early awards of property rights 
and some which push for late awards. Ideally, property doctrine would take 
account of the relative strength of these considerations, which dictate the point 
in time—or equivalently, the standard of performance—that should count as 
satisfying the possession requirement with respect to a particular resource. 
Figure 1 below illustrates the marginal benefits and costs of pushing back the 
moment that is deemed to satisfy the possession requirement. Formally, the 
optimal time to deem possession as having been established is the point where 
the marginal benefit and marginal cost are equal. Differences in the way property 
law approaches first possession can be understood as reflecting how the balance 
between the relative pros and cons of early and late awards changes for different 
resources along the course of their acquisition. 
 
47 See Ellickson, supra note 45, at 90-92 (discussing “iron-holds-the-whale” property 
norm, which required affixment of harpoon to whale coupled with fresh pursuit). 
48 See Swift v. Gifford, 23 F. Cas. 558, 560 (D. Mass. 1872) (“[H]e who first strikes [the 
whale] so effectually that the iron remains fast should have the better right, the pursuit still 
continuing, it is reasonable, though merely conventional, and ought to be upheld.”). 
49 See Ellickson, supra note 45, at 90-92. First-committed-searcher rules are frequently 
coupled with a requirement that the claimant eventually complete capture before a durable 
property right will be awarded. The primary role of the first-committed-searcher rule in these 
situations is to provide the priority rule used to resolve disputes between two otherwise valid 
claims, establishing the point in time used to resolve the contest between them. 
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Figure 1. Optimal Timing of Possession.50 
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Understanding this balance and the shift in equilibrium from one resource 
context to another depends on an analysis of the competing forces that push in 
favor of early and late awards. The magnitude of these concerns varies with 
changes in factors such as the characteristics of the resources at issue, the ways 
people desire to use them, the manner in which they are likely to be pursued, 
and the technologies available to the legal system.51 But the core concerns that 
underlie this tradeoff are strikingly stable across the landscape of property law.52 
The principal danger of awarding rights too early in the development process 
is the risk that they will go to someone who will fail to complete the proverbial 
 
50 The curves are drawn schematically and need not be straight lines. While in many cases 
it is reasonable to assume that the marginal benefit curve is downward sloping and that the 
marginal cost curve is upward sloping, other depictions can fit equally well without any 
significant change in the analysis. For example, the marginal cost curve may be flat. The only 
essential assumption for the argument about a reasonably administrable optimal timing for 
possession is that the marginal benefit curve initially lies above the marginal cost curve, and 
that they intersect just once. When these assumptions are violated, first possession may not 
be a suitable candidate for allocating property rights over previously unowned resources, 
which is consistent with alternative social mechanisms for resource management, such as 
common property or auctions. The discussion of such mechanisms is beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
51 Cf. Elinor Ostrom, Private and Common Property Rights, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW 
AND ECONOMICS: CIVIL LAW AND ECONOMICS 332, 338 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De 
Geest eds., 2000) (arguing that optimal strategy is to manage common property changes based 
on given resource’s purpose of use, quantity, related technology, and other factors). 
52 See infra note 69 and accompanying text (noting importance of property right timing to 
optimize variety of resources). 
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chase, leaving the resource underused.53 In such cases, it would have been better 
to allow the ownership race to continue. The problem is essentially one of 
misallocation. Awarding exclusive rights to a resource at an early stage when 
considerable work must still be done to put the resource to use involves the 
possibility that the resource will be awarded to someone who is not very good 
at—and possibly incapable of—carrying out the tasks that still remain.54 Late 
awards can therefore be seen as a mechanism to identify the more capable, cost-
effective searchers.  
When a party receives an early award but fails to follow through, the right can 
sometimes be reallocated to a more capable party through voluntary exchange 
or, perhaps, via abandonment and a new contest for possession.55 Such 
reallocations, however, will often be associated with transaction costs, which 
may be prohibitive or otherwise entail significant waste, such as delay in the use 
of the resource and search and negotiation costs associated with the reallocation 
process itself.56 Further, early awards may incentivize those who are incapable 
of completing the chase but are able to take an early lead (deemed sufficient to 
obtain a property right) to nevertheless join the race and do so.57 But their hope 
of profiting from such early lead may disincentivize more capable pursuers from 
joining in. Paying to get the entitlement from the less capable yet early pursuer 
would reduce their incentive to successfully complete the series of actions 
necessary to bring the resource into its ultimate use.  
On the other side of the ledger, a system in which rights are awarded later—
as under a rule of capture—presents two chief social costs. One is excessive and 
wasteful investment in resource search and pursuit.58 Efforts expended by those 
 
53 See supra note 21 and accompanying text (discussing importance of timing when 
conferring property interests); see also Eric R. Claeys, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Gridlock, 
53 ARIZ. L. REV. 9, 10 (2011) (“[W]hen too many individuals have the rights to exclude in 
relation to a resource, the resources may be underused.”). 
54 See Lueck, supra note 32, at 394 (discussing critics who claim that early property awards 
granted in homesteading, oil and gas extraction, and patent process encourage suboptimal 
resource use and overexploitation). 
55 See, e.g., Gary D. Libecap, Assigning Property Rights in the Common Pool: 
Implications of the Prevalence of First-Possession Rules for ITQs in Fisheries, 22 MARINE 
RESOURCES ECON. 407, 413 (2009) (noting that while first possession “rewards exploration 
and risk taking,” later trade can “reallocate the resource to higher-valued users” and more 
efficient uses). 
56 See id. at 409. 
57 Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill, The Race for Property Rights, 33 J.L. & ECON. 177, 
183-84 (1990) (discussing this phenomenon in context of squatters and speculators in land-
based property regimes). 
58 See Lueck, supra note 32, at 402 (“[L]aws that rely on first possession tend to define 
possession and grant ownership quite early to thwart wasteful investment.”); see also Barzel, 
supra note 26, at 352 n.11 (suggesting that earlier grants of rights will prevent resources from 
being wasted in course of competition); Duffy, supra note 15, at 443-44 (noting preference 
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who set out to capture a resource but are beaten by someone else are often 
deadweight social loss, and to the extent later awards result in claimants having 
to do more work to receive rights, later awards will mean that ownership races 
may last longer and involve a greater number of participants and greater levels 
of wasteful duplication of effort.59 The other, and related, problem with late 
awards concerns their incentive effects. Because those who unsuccessfully 
compete for a resource get nothing for their troubles, would-be competitors may 
be discouraged from entering the competition in the first place.60 The greater 
their troubles—i.e., the larger the investment in time, labor, and money they 
must make to obtain the resource—the greater the discouragement.61 
Given the wasteful duplication problem, this could be a good thing, up to a 
point: fear of losing might reduce the number of competitors and therefore the 
amount of wasted investment.62 But it would be the rare case that these two 
factors would be perfectly offsetting.  
In many cases, late awards will not have these two offsetting effects on entry 
simultaneously, as the two often arise in different settings. Excessive entry that 
leads to wasteful, duplicative effort and rent dissipation is likely to arise in 
settings where participants are reasonably assured that the per-participant 
expected value of joining the race are greater than or equal to the cost of 
participating.63 Good examples are the fishery,64 a grazing commons, and 
 
for granting property rights early can avoid wasteful duplications of effort); Aditya Bamzai, 
Comment, The Wasteful Duplication Thesis in Natural Monopoly Regulation, 71 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1525, 1525 (2004). 
59 Peter S. Menell & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property Law, in 2 HANDBOOK OF 
LAW AND ECONOMICS 1475, 1489 (A.M. Polinsky & S. Shavell eds., 2007). 
60 Steve P. Calandrillo, An Economic Analysis of Property Rights in Information: 
Justifications and Problems of Exclusive Rights, Incentives to Generate Information, and the 
Alternative of a Government-Run Reward System, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. 
L.J. 301, 307 n.17 (1998) (“However, we must not lose sight of the wasted effort put forth by 
the loser of the race, which is a social loss that is usually unrecoverable. The reward system 
would not solve this dilemma, but the existence of the problem militates towards a scheme in 
which the beneficiary of the reward should be recognized early on . . . .”). 
61 This concern extends more broadly than the concern about wasteful duplication of effort. 
If a competitor is able to capitalize on a would-be claimant’s contributions, there is no social 
waste as such, but there is a private loss when the claimant is unable to recoup her costs. The 
disincentive to participation this creates can thus result in what is ultimately a social loss. 
62 Cf. Lueck, supra note 32, at 399-400 (suggesting heterogeneity among claimants may 
reduce wasteful competition by discouraging entry). 
63 Richard S. Higgins, William F. Shughart II & Robert G. Tollison, Free Entry and 
Efficient Rent Seeking: Efficient Rents 2, 46 PUB. CHOICE 247, 255 (1985) (“[W]hen there are 
no restrictions on the number of individuals who may vie for the right to capture . . . entry 
will occur, and resources will be spent up to the point where the expected net value of the 
transfer is zero.”). 
64 For a classical treatment of one such case, see H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory 
of Common-Property Resource: The Fishery, 62 J. POL. ECON. 124, 130-31 (1954) 
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multiple-party drilling into a common oil reservoir. To illustrate, imagine an 
open fishery governed by the rule of capture. Assume that the per-day costs and 
benefits, as a function of the number of fishermen, are as follows: 
 
Table 1. The Fishery: Public and Private Costs and Yield as a Function of the 









Net Expected Profit 
per Fisherman 
0 0 0 0 0 
1 10 16 6 6 
2 20 29 9 4.5 
3 30 40 10 3.33 
4 40 49 9 2.25 
5 50 56 6 1.2 
6 60 61 1 0.16 
7 70 64 (-6) (-0.85) 
 
The first column in Table 1 simply designates different numbers of fishermen 
that may operate on the fishery. The second column reflects the assumption that 
operating a boat on the fishery costs ten dollars, such that the total social cost of 
fishing is ten times the number of fishermen. The third column reflects an 
assumption of diminishing marginal returns per unit of effort, a general 
phenomenon observed in the world. Here, this assumption can be motivated by 
the realization that fishery congestion reduces the fishery’s yield.65 The fourth 
column is simply the difference between the third and the second columns. The 
last column divides the fourth column by the first to obtain the per fisherman net 
expected return. 
As Table 1 suggests, it would be socially optimal that only three fishermen 
operate on the fishery, which would maximize the fourth column, “Net Expected 
Social Value.” However, since all are free to join the fishing race, as many as 
six fishermen would enter, because the expected private return to entry would 
still be positive (see the last column). Though such entry would be privately 
beneficial, it is excessive from a social point of view because it decreases the net 
social value of the fishery. Each of the fourth, fifth, and sixth entrants increases 
 
(suggesting that, on common properties with free entry, number of entrants would be 
excessive, tending to dissipate value of the resource). A similar scenario applies for an oil 
field that lies beneath land parcels owned by many owners, from which each could drill and 
extract oil. 
65 The diminishing returns assumption can be motivated easily respecting the fishery. 
Doubling the number of boats on the fishery from one to two, say, will not likely result in 
double yield because of friction between the two fishermen: sometimes one would catch a 
fish that the other would have caught had it been alone on the fishery, or because they would 
get in each other’s way occasionally and slow down. 
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social costs by ten dollars, but increases social value by an amount lesser than 
ten. In essence, each fisherman joining the fishery disregards the negative 
externality it imposes on others. For our purposes, an implicit assumption 
supports the conclusion of excessive entry, which is that fish are many, that a 
fishing day involves the fishing of many fish, and that all fishermen are similarly 
situated and can observe the number of fishermen on the fishery. In such cases, 
each fishermen knows, virtually with certainty, that she will cover her costs and 
will not operate at a loss. 
Things are different in a scenario where race participants are not assured of 
recouping their participation costs with reasonable certainty. Such is 
characteristically the case when there is one prize, allocated to one winner at the 
end of a relatively costly and prolonged pursuit. Take, for instance, a potential 
company pursuing a pharmaceutical patent where the expected revenue—if the 
chase is successful—is $1.5 billion, but where research and development 
(“R&D”) is expected to last five years and cost $1 billion. Patents are awarded 
under a rule of capture to the first to complete R&D. Firms cannot know how 
many others are participating in the R&D race. If firms believe that there’s a 
significant chance that a rival might get the patent before they do, the firms may 
be reluctant to begin R&D, fearing a worst case scenario where they may invest 
nearly the full one billion dollars only to discover that a rival filed for a patent 
before they did. In contrast to the first scenario, a participant in this race cannot 
be assured to cover costs (i.e., there is a greater risk involved), and does not 
know exactly how many others are already in the race (so she might join a race 
with a negative expected value).  
Later awards may further deter entry in cases where a claimant can free-ride 
on the investments of others who have accomplished earlier steps that enable 
capture.66 While free-riding avoids duplication of effort, it can lead to especially 
sharp disincentive effects to the extent it weakens the correspondence between 
the size of investment and the likelihood of winning the competition.67 If 
ownership is assigned to someone who merely delivers the coup de grâce, others 
will be reluctant to undertake costlier or more difficult parts of the hunt that 
make the ultimate kill possible. 
The downward sloping curve in Figure 1 represents the marginal benefit of 
delaying the moment that the law regards as possession in the chronology of a 
resource’s pursuit. The curve is positive, indicating that there is always some 
benefit to delaying the award of rights. The further along in the chronology of 
the chase the pursuer is, the greater the probability that she will complete it 
 
66 See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 30, at 1039-40 (“The professed fear is that property owners 
won’t invest sufficient resources in their property if others can free ride on that investment.”). 
67 Jerome H. Reichman, How Trade Secrecy Law Generates a Natural Semicommons of 
Innovative Know-How, in THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF 
CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 185, 196 (Rochell C. Dreyfuss, Katherine J. Strandburg & Edward 
Elgar eds., 2011) (noting that free riding by competitors creates disincentives to invest in 
innovation in the first place). 
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successfully. Gains represented by increases in the probability of success often 
accrue at a decreasing rate, however.  
To illustrate, imagine a hunter chasing a fox in a dense forest. Assume that 
the hunter is moving at twenty feet per second and the fox at ten feet per second, 
and that the probability that the hunter will catch the fox is a decreasing linear 
function of the area that the hunter needs to scout in search of the fox. If the 
hunter spots the fox from one hundred feet away, by the time she reaches the 
place she saw it, the fox could be hiding anywhere in a circle with an area of 
roughly 2,500? square feet (?*502), because the fox could have traveled fifty 
feet in any direction during that time. By the same logic, if the sighting were 
from eighty feet away, the fox would have to be searched for in an area of 1,600? 
square feet, and if it were seen from sixty feet away, the search area would be 
900? square feet. The first twenty foot movement reduced the search area by 
900? square feet (from 2,500? to 1,600?), the next twenty foot movement 
toward the fox reduced that area by only 700? square feet (from 1,600? to 
900?). So while the benefits of progressing in the race toward the fox remain 
positive, they accrue at a decreasing rate.  
The upward sloping curve in Figure 1, meanwhile, represents the marginal 
cost of delaying the moment defined as possession. Again, this curve is positive 
because there is a cost to prolonging the race—racers will incur duplicative and 
wasteful costs throughout the relevant timeframe. It is drawn as upward sloping 
because longer races may be more costly per unit of time: longer hunting races, 
for example, generally require the participants to carry more equipment and 
provisions. Moreover, races that last longer may allow more parties to join. The 
likelihood of either wasteful duplication of effort or depressed participation 
resulting in underdevelopment can therefore be expected to increase with time.68  
A few further comments about the relationship between time and resource 
waste are in order. The literature on possession has given considerable attention 
to issues of wasteful competition associated with possession-based regimes, 
with a special emphasis on timing issues.69 Any rule for claiming resources has 
 
68 While Figure 1 depicts what we believe are the most likely shapes of the marginal cost 
and benefit curves associated with ownership races, these shapes are not essential. For 
example, our analysis applies equally well to races characterized by a fixed marginal cost. In 
that case, the marginal cost curve would be flat, and nothing in the analysis would change 
materially. The optimal time of possession would still be determined by the intersection of 
the two curves, and a relatively high fixed marginal cost would suggest that possession should 
be awarded earlier in time during the race compared to an alternative of a lower fixed marginal 
cost. See supra note 50. 
69 See, e.g., Anderson & Hill, supra note 57, at 177 (“Economics literature on the evolution 
of property rights has increasingly emphasized the optimal timing for establishing those 
rights.”); Richard A. Epstein, Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension of the Law of 
Property, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 667, 670 (1986) (“Time offers a unique measuring rod, sufficient 
in principle to resolve two or two thousand competing claims for priority.”); David D. 
Haddock, First Possession Versus Optimal Timing: Limiting the Dissipation of Economic 
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the potential to distort people’s behavior because in theory, a rational claimant 
should be willing to spend up to the expected value of a given resource itself in 
order to obtain it.70 Unless there is social value in the actions that the law requires 
a person to take to establish a claim to a resource that is at least equal to the 
value of the resource to a claimant, the rule will lead to excessive claiming and 
deadweight loss (including the value of establishing ownership). It might not be 
the end of the world to have to queue up the night before to get tickets to a rock 
concert, for example, but on the whole, the queuing process itself wastes 
people’s time and is justifiable only if there is no better way to distribute tickets. 
In this last case, an auction rather than a first possession based queue might be 
the better allocation mechanism.71 
Early awards under a first-committed-searcher rule present a special problem 
in this regard. The genius of anchoring the award of rights in possession is that 
they can avoid the sort of waste that a claiming protocol might otherwise 
generate because they require claimants to perform a task that is itself necessary 
for the resource to be used. A rule awarding ownership of a parcel of farmland 
to the best dressed person at City Hall next Tuesday creates incentives to engage 
in otherwise pointless behavior—showing up at City Hall in fancy clothes on 
Tuesday. By contrast, a rule awarding ownership of the land to the person who 
begins the process of cultivating it only encourages a claimant to do something 
she would have done anyway to enjoy the property. It is effectively costless.72 
This singular advantage of reliance on possession is less likely to hold true, 
however, to the extent possession rules adhere to a first-committed-searcher 
model. Since first-committed searcher-rules identify steps that are more 
preliminary in the overall process of putting a resource to use, there is a greater 
risk that those steps are not actually optimal, or even necessary, to the resource’s 
ultimate development.73 So, for example, one problem with awarding possession 
 
Value, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 775, 783 (1986) (“Timing is also a concern when modeling 
innovation and the sometimes valuable patents and copyrights that follow.”); Lueck, supra 
note 32, at 398 (“Maximizing resource value is, in effect, a problem of optimally timing the 
establishment of rights . . . .”); Ronen Perry & Tal Z. Zarsky, Queues in Law, 99 IOWA L. REV. 
1595, 1629 (2014) (suggesting that allocation of “specific assets at a relatively early stage, 
when claimant heterogeneity is still large” can partly resolve issue of wasteful races and 
duplicative investments). 
70 The value of the resource would be discounted by the probability of being unsuccessful 
in claiming it. 
71 See supra note 50. 
72 There may be costs and distortions, however, to the extent the action constituting 
possession does not facilitate a particular use, or worse, is actually incompatible with that use. 
Animal conservation, for instance, is at odds with a rule requiring mortal wounding, and an 
interest in confidentiality of an expressive work would conflict with a rule requiring 
publication. 
73 See Claeys, supra note 53, at 10 (noting that early award of property rights can lead to 
underutilization of resources). 
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of the fox in Pierson v. Post to the first person to saddle up and mount a horse 
is that it might not actually be necessary to use a horse to catch the fox—as 
farmer Pierson showed. 
Even when possession rules are perfectly designed, there is still the potential 
for distortion, however, insofar as they center on first possession and therefore 
reward not just the ability to take possession but to do so faster than anyone else. 
Awarding a pot of gold to the first person across the finish line creates identical 
incentives to invest in training, whether the race itself is a one-hundred-meter 
sprint or a marathon. The sprinter will train just as hard as the marathoner to win 
the race, even though the amount of energy needed to move a human body 26.2 
miles is much greater than the amount needed to move it one hundred meters. 
And unlike possession itself, faster possession is not necessarily essential to the 
optimal use of the resource.74 For this reason, first-committed-searcher rules 
may have some value to the extent they do not require as much work to be 
completed before ownership is awarded. How much this is true is uncertain, 
however. If instead of doing more to develop a resource, claimants direct their 
energies to qualify as first-committed searchers faster, early awards may face 
the same problem of inefficient racing for resources.75 In addition, faster 
claiming and faster resource development may often be valuable in and of itself 
and also generate positive external benefits—particularly for intellectual 
property.76 Concerns about wasteful racing may therefore be less pressing than 
they are sometimes made out to be.77 It should also be noted that, apart from 
investments in speed, competition can generate social waste by encouraging 
behavior intended to tilt the competitive field—theft and fencing, espionage and 
secrecy, sabotage and conflict.78 To the extent later awards translate to more 
protracted competition, they present a greater danger of social cost through such 
anti-competitive conduct. 
Figure 2 sets out the central concerns in the design of rules for awarding 
property rights. The costs identified are relative: in most cases, the drawbacks 
that are listed can occur at some level with either late or early awards, but they 
 
74 See Lueck, supra note 32, at 399 (noting that “rush” of competitors can lead to early 
grant of possession that is neither socially optimal nor valuable). 
75 See Donald G. McFetridge & Douglas A. Smith, Patents, Prospects, and Economic 
Surplus: A Comment, 23 J.L. & ECON. 197, 201 (1980) (noting negative effects when 
possession rights go to “first rather than the best” claimant). 
76 See Douglas W. Allen, Homesteading and Property Rights; or, “How the West Was 
Really Won,” 34 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1-6 (1991) (arguing that incentives for faster settlement 
created by 19th century homesteading policies reduced enforcement costs and helped secure 
U.S. government claims to western land). 
77 See Duffy, supra note 15, at 467-68 (noting that inefficiencies of racing in intellectual 
property are not significant). 
78 See ROBERT D. ATKINSON & STEPHEN J. EZELL, INNOVATION ECONOMICS: THE RACE FOR 
GLOBAL ADVANTAGE 190 (2012) (“[T]he race for global innovation advantage creates both 
global opportunities and threats, because countries can implement their innovation policies in 
ways that are either ‘good,’ ‘bad,’ or ‘ugly.’”). 
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are thought to be comparatively more serious with one model than with the other. 
At least within the context of intellectual property, failure to follow through is 
generally the most significant danger associated with early awards—especially 
where early awards result in rights that are broader than anything the claimant 
could possibly develop—while disincentives to compete and wasteful 
duplication are generally the most significant drawback of late ones. 
 
Figure 2. Early vs. Late Awards.  
 
Costs of Early Awards 
(First Committed Searcher) 
Costs of Late Awards 
(Actual Capture) 
 Deadweight loss from misallocation to 
less capable/incapable claimants 
▫ Resource underuse/non-use 
▫ Transaction and reassignment costs 
 
 Wasteful claiming conduct 
▫ Inefficient racing to begin search 
▫ Unnecessary search behavior 
 
 Slower capture/completion 
(when faster development desired) 
 
 Greater uncertainty as to resource 
boundaries and characteristics 
 
 Often an ambiguous standard that 
requires discretion in application (e.g., 
as to what “committed” means) 
 Disincentives to compete from risk of 
lost investment, especially with free-
riding 
 
 Wasteful duplication of effort  
 
 Wasteful claiming conduct 
▫ Inefficient racing to capture 
▫ Inefficient capture rates 
(e.g., endangered species) 
  
 Where rights are time-limited, longer 
effective exclusivity period 
  
 Other competitive waste  
▫ Self-help, fencing, secrecy 
▫ Theft and espionage 
▫ Interfering capture activities 
▫ Sabotage, conflict, violence 
 
The basic trade-off discussed above and depicted in Figures 1 and 2 has been 
idealized and simplified in our discussion so far. In practice, administrability 
concerns are a third variable that is often critical.79 In Figure 1, the proper point 
in time to award property rights would in theory be time t*—the exact point in 
the possession continuum where the marginal benefit of delay just equals its 
cost. For a number of reasons, however, the meaning of possession in various 
contexts will also be shaped by practical demands like the need for clear rules, 
intuitive concepts, and notice to race participants. To avoid wasteful duplication 
of effort and lost investments, for instance, it is important for would-be 
 
79 Michael W. Carroll, One Size Does Not Fit All: A Framework for Tailoring Intellectual 
Property Rights, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1363, 1424-30 (2009) (discussing importance of 
administrability when creating effective IP regime). 
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competitors to be able to observe and understand what counts as possession 
fairly easily so that, e.g., they know not to continue expending efforts to win a 
race that has already ended.80 It does not do much good to end the race early 
(i.e., declare a winner and stop the simultaneous search effort) if the other 
participants do not know it is over. A clear test for possession also helps forestall 
conflict among would-be competitors, encourages investment and facilitates 
exchange by providing security of holdings, and reduces the costs of 
administering and policing a property system.81 While the need for clear and 
intuitive tests for possession does not intrinsically align with either early or late 
awards, in practice it tended to skew in favor of later awards at common law 
because actual capture is often, though not always, more unambiguous than a 
committed search.  
The technology of the hunt determines what points in its chronology can even 
be considered as viable candidates for possession from the perspective of 
providing notice. In the context of hunting foxes, for example, it seems that such 
informational considerations push for the rule of capture. What earlier stage in 
the hunt could be set as the standard for a first-committed searcher? A certain 
distance from the fox? A wound? If so, what type of wound confers property 
rights (a scratch or mortal wounds)? What are the chances that other hunters 
would be able to see both the hunter and the fox and determine the distance 
between them in a dense forest? In the context of whaling, by contrast, the act 
of sinking a harpoon into the body of the whale in the open sea by a party in hot 
pursuit is a clear—or at least much clearer—informational marker to third 
parties, and makes the first-committed-searcher rule a much more viable 
candidate. The administrability concern adds to those discussed previously, and 
can push the timing of grants of exclusive rights to either earlier or later points 
in time. 
To return to the example of Ellickson’s whalers cited earlier,82 the trade-offs 
embodied in the choice between first-committed-searcher and actual capture 
models are evident in both the features that were universal among whaling norms 
across all whaling fisheries and the ways in which those norms differed. As 
Ellickson notes, no group of whalers adopted a rule awarding exclusive rights in 
a whale to the first crew to lower a boat in pursuit.83 That would be too soon. 
Why? It would create too great a risk of awarding the prize to someone less 
 
80 Cf. Kitch, supra note 27, at 278 (arguing that patents act as signaling devices to 
competing firms to reduce amount of duplicative investment in innovation). 
81 Joseph William Singer, The Rule of Reason in Property Law, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1369, 1376 (2013) (noting that clear property regime “allows actors to invest in reliance on 
clear rules of the game, avoids unfair surprise, controls the arbitrary discretion of judges, and 
promotes equality before the law by treating like cases alike”). 
82 See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text (discussing Robert Ellickson’s seminal 
study of nineteenth century whalers). 
83 See Ellickson, supra note 45, at 88 n.14, 95 (noting that certain norms, including “first 
boat in the water” were not observed in whaling industry). 
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capable of completing the task of capture, it would create incentives to get boats 
in the water earlier than would be optimal, and it would not send a clear signal 
as to which whale the whaler intended to pursue. At the other end of the 
spectrum, neither did any of the whaling communities wait until a whale was 
actually killed to assign claims to the animal. Among other difficulties, such a 
rule would risk rewarding free-riders seeking to benefit from the significant 
efforts others had already made to subdue a whale. Rather, both rules—iron-
holds-the-whale (first-committed searcher) and fast-fish-loose-fish (rule of 
capture)—pick points that are in between. 
The same concerns also help account for the way norms among whalers 
differed in different contexts. Sperm whales tend to be relatively fast swimmers 
and vigorous fighters,84 prone to diving when harpooned, which often made it 
necessary for the fishermen to cut the line lest their ship sink. Their hunt 
involved costly and prolonged chases—over days—during which the whale 
would be tired out. Waiting until a sperm whale had been brought under actual 
control before giving a whaler a claim to the animal risked failing to reward 
those whose early efforts made later capture possible—the free-riding problem. 
The iron-holds-the-whale rule therefore seems to have been adapted to 
conditions presented in sperm whale fisheries.85 The right whales predominant 
elsewhere, by contrast, were comparatively slow swimmers with docile 
temperaments.86 There was little need to award possession sooner, and waiting 
until the whale had been brought under actual control ensured that the whale 
went to the person who had “performed the hardest part of the hunt.”87 
To summarize: the primary problem with early awards is the risk that a 
claimant will fail to proceed successfully with development of a resource after 
being awarded it. The primary problems with late awards are the potential for 
prolonging costly multiparty races and disincentivizing race participation when 
participation is time-consuming and costly. Determining the moment of 
possession should be made in light of the ability to convey clear notice to race 
participants as to the moment in which a resource is taken into possession. Those 
considerations play out differently for different resources. 
II. ORIGINAL ACQUISITION IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
The concept of possession might not seem like it has much to do with 
intellectual property. Possession has a certain physical flavor,88 and the 
resources IP law governs are intangible by definition. A human being cannot 
 
84 See id. at 425 (discussing nature of sperm whales). 
85 See id.  
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 89. 
88 See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 216 (Little, Brown & Co. 1945) 
(1881) (“To gain possession, then, a man must stand in a certain physical relation to the object 
and to the rest of the world . . . .”). 
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literally reach out and grab an idea, much less skewer it with a harpoon. As one 
venerable eighteenth-century jurist put it, “But how is possession to be taken, or 
any act of occupancy to be asserted, on mere intellectual ideas? . . . All writers 
agree that no act of occupancy can be asserted on a bare idea of the mind.”89 
Yet the concept of possession can be extended to apply to intellectual 
creations without conceptual or linguistic violence. We certainly speak of 
possessing intangibles, like a sense of humor90 or a secret.91 Indeed, IP doctrines 
occasionally invoke the concept of possession explicitly, most obviously in the 
case of patent law’s “written description” requirement.92 Just like “property” 
serves as an imperfect analogy to “intellectual property,” so does “first 
possession” to “original acquisition of intellectual property.” 
The concept of possession, as property law has traditionally conceived it, is 
oriented around the notion of control, a state of affairs that brings a person 
substantially closer to being able to put a resource to use.93 Although the various 
doctrines governing the award of IP rights for the most part avoid the language 
of possession, the basic concept of possession carries over to intellectual 
property and the model of first possession developed in property law can be 
usefully extended to major segments of IP law. This Articles stresses that there 
is no single first possession doctrine in these fields. Multiple interacting 
doctrines and concepts that together function as a system of original acquisition 
govern the award of rights.94  
 
89 Millar v. Taylor (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 231 (KB) (Yates, J., dissenting).; see also 
Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 669 (1834) (Thompson, J., dissenting) (discussing 
Justice Yate’s dissent in Millar). 
90 See, e.g., David E. Engdahl, John Marshall’s “Jeffersonian” Concept of Judicial 
Review, 42 DUKE L.J. 279, 329 (1992) (stating that Chief Justice John Marshall “possessed a 
self-effacing charm and good humor”). 
91 See, e.g., ELIZABETH A. ROWE & SHARON K. SANDEEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
TRADE SECRET LAW 14-17 (2012) (noting that for over a century and a half since founding, 
trade secrecy law in the United States developed primarily through common law 
adjudication). 
92 A patent specification must “demonstrate that the patentee was in possession of the 
invention that is claimed.” Capon v. Eshhar, 418 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Further, a 
patent filing must “put the public in possession of what the party claims as his own invention.” 
Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 924 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting Evans 
v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356, 433-34 (1822)). If a prior disclosure of the invention was 
sufficient to place the invention “in the possession of the public,” however, no patent can 
issue. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharm., Inc., 471 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
93 See Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175, 178 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (requiring acts that bring 
animal within person’s “certain control” before that person can be said to be in possession of 
it). 
94 Indeed, patent law’s written description requirement, which refers to possession by 
name, plays a relatively peripheral role in the larger set of issues we are concerned with and 
is not a major focus of this Article’s analysis. 
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Conceptually speaking, first possession has several basic hallmarks. It is, of 
course, a device that establishes when property rights begin and the identity of 
the first person to hold them.95 It is, moreover, a relatively decentralized 
mechanism for doing so: initial ownership depends on the performance of some 
sort of act by the first owner that, in principle, does not require any direct 
involvement with a governmental authority.96 Perfection of rights can be made 
contingent on registration with or verification by some government body that 
the requisite action has been performed—i.e., that the claimant has taken 
possession—but the act of taking possession is itself undertaken by private 
actors at their own initiative.97 
In terms of its more specific content, first possession is a system based on 
temporal priority—the first person to do something wins. Others who carry out 
the necessary steps are precluded if someone else did so before them. As for the 
possession element, it entails more than mere desire or plotting and less than 
ultimate consumption, or even the completion of every task necessary for 
consumption to occur.98 Possession is oriented around the notion of practical 
control, in which the would-be owner stands in a special relationship to the 
resource and changes its character in a manner consistent with its eventual use 
and consumption.99 In what follows, this Article reviews a number of patent, 
trademark, and copyright doctrines which together align with this set of features. 
Original acquisition rules play two related yet analytically distinct roles. First, 
these rules determine winners and losers in priority disputes among competitors 
who are racing simultaneously to own the same resource.100 This may be thought 
of as the “first” part of “first possession.” While this context generally parallels 
the discussion of common law priority contests featured prominently in Pierson 
v. Post, intellectual property brings its own quirks. 
Second, original acquisition rules also determine the point in time—and 
equivalently the standard of performance—at which entitlements vest, 
 
95 See, e.g., Lueck, supra note 32, at 425 (describing how first possession-based whaling 
customs made it clear who had valid claim to whale and when). 
96 Rose, supra note 5, at 76 (“Possession thus means a clear act, whereby all the world 
understands that the pursuer has ‘an unequivocal intention of appropriating the [property] to 
his individual use.’” (quoting Pierson, 3 Cai. at 178)). 
97 John L. McCormack, Torrens and Recording: Land Title Assurance in the Computer 
Age, 18 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 61, 67 (1992) (noting that recording land deed with the 
government is way to perfect ownership, but is not required to have valid legal claim to 
property). 
98 Detroit Edison Co. v. Mich. Air Pollution Control Comm’n, 423 N.W.2d 306, 310 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (“To constitute a protectable right, a person must have more than an 
abstract need, desire or unilateral expectation of the right.”). 
99 Nicole L. Johnson, Property Without Possession, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 205, 223 (2007) 
(noting that right to surface water, for instance, is partly determined by the extent the owner 
puts resource to “beneficial use”). 
100 See, e.g., Pierson, 3 Cai. at 175. 
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irrespective of the existence of a priority contest.101 This may be thought of as 
the “possession” part of “first possession.” This can often take the form of a 
determination about what it is that can be possessed and become the subject of 
property rights. This function is more pronounced in intellectual property: while 
the nature of a fox is unchanged whether it is owned under either a first-
committed-searcher rule or a rule of capture, in intellectual property, the thing 
owned often differs with the rule of original acquisition. Since the would-be 
owner often creates and perfects the thing to be owned, a later time of acquisition 
practically means that intellectual creations (or ideas) at an earlier stage of 
development are not subject to ownership. This function of original acquisition 
rules implicates questions about both the acquisition of any rights whatsoever as 
well as the scope of protection in cases where some rights have clearly been 
acquired.  
These two functions are intimately connected. Whether a claimant has 
performed the action necessary to acquire exclusive rights will very frequently 
dispose of any priority questions. The two issues can be disaggregated, however, 
and the discussion that follows examines them separately, at least in part. 
Questions of what might be thought of as pure priority, involving conflicting 
claims by multiple actors for the very same resource are discussed under the 
heading of “priority.” Questions that center more squarely on the standard for 
protection itself are discussed in terms of “protectability.” The partial separation 
in the analysis grows out of a recognition that protectability questions are more 
pronounced for intellectual property than for physical resources. Nevertheless, 
it should be remembered that there is a great deal of overlap between the two 
aspects of claiming by possession and the division should be understood only as 
differences in emphasis and not as establishing mutually exclusive categories of 
doctrine. 
A. Patent 
Priority. The process of invention can be broken down into a series of mental 
and physical steps beginning with conception of the core inventive idea—what 
is often imagined as the “Eureka!” moment102—and ending with what patent 
lawyers call “reduction to practice,” which can be accomplished by assembling 
a working version of the invention or by filing a valid patent application that 
 
101 See, e.g., Lueck, supra note 32, at 425 (describing customary standards of performance 
required to establish valid claim to whale); see also supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text 
(discussing Ellickson’s seminal study of nineteenth century whalers). 
102 Or perhaps, “hmm, that’s funny . . . .” See CRAIG C. LUNDBERG & CHERI A. YOUNG, 
FOUNDATIONS FOR INQUIRY: CHOICES AND TRADE-OFFS IN THE ORGANIZATIONAL SCIENCES 
378 (2005); JESSICA SILBEY, THE EUREKA MYTH: CREATORS, INNOVATORS, AND EVERYDAY 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 25-26 (2015) (discussing role of “Eureka” moment in process of 
innovation and law’s treatment of “Eureka” moment). 
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teaches others how to do so.103 For our purposes, the process is analogous to the 
hunt of wild animals like foxes and whales, which similarly goes through stages 
of inspiration, pursuit, capture, and use.104 Patent law decides between rival 
claimants to inventive technologies by identifying the first person to reach a 
certain stage on this developmental timeline, and in this way it can be mapped 
onto the general model of first possession that describes common law property. 
Even more so than with tangible goods, reliance upon first possession in the IP 
context raises questions about how to model possession. 
The two basic approaches to first possession we have discussed—first-
committed searcher and actual capture—produce the same result when the same 
actor is first to both begin and complete the hunt. But often this does not occur, 
and when it does not, the two rules come apart. Suppose, for example, that 
Edison has an idea for a particular invention before Tesla, a lightbulb let’s say. 
But Tesla is nevertheless the first to complete the intellectual hunt, building an 
actual working version of the idea. In the language of patent law, Edison was the 
first to conceive the invention but Tesla was the first to reduce it to practice. 
Such a fact pattern is depicted in the timeline in Figure 3.  
 













In U.S. patent law from the start of the republic and for more than two 
centuries thereafter, this sort of invention race was governed by what was in 
effect a first-committed-searcher rule. Even today, for patent applications filed 
 
103 See Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 
1986) (requiring inventor to reduce conception to practice, which “requires that the claimed 
invention work for its intended purpose”); Brunswick Corp. v. United States, 34 Fed. Cl. 532, 
583-84 (1995) (noting importance of timing of reducing conception to practice). 
104 Conception requires more than simply a general idea of how to proceed. See Burroughs 
Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“Conception is 
complete only when the idea is so clearly defined in the inventor’s mind that only ordinary 
skill would be necessary to reduce the invention to practice, without extensive research or 
experimentation.”). 
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before March 16, 2013,105 the patent would be awarded to whomever was first 
to conceive of the invention provided that party exercised “reasonable diligence” 
in reducing the invention to practice.106 Under this regime, Edison would receive 
the patent, so long as he remained in diligent pursuit of the ultimate working 
invention. Such priority disputes were adjudicated through quasi-judicial 
“interference proceedings” before the Board of Patent Appeals and 
Interferences. This so-called first-to-invent priority rule is a clear patent law 
analog to the first-committed-searcher model of first possession. 
The first-to-invent rule was abandoned following enactment of the Leahy-
Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”) in 2011, the most comprehensive overhaul 
of U.S. patent law in at least half a century.107 Its most prominent change was to 
replace the first-to-invent rule with a first-to-file system, or more precisely, a 
system that awards patents to the first person to disclose their invention to the 
public, whether by filing a patent application or through other public acts.108 The 
AIA thus pushes back the temporal lynchpin from the beginning of the inventive 
process to its end.109 
The upshot of this new rule is that even if someone sets out in pursuit of an 
invention before the competition and is thus the first committed inventor, the 
race goes on and may very well be won by another who manages to complete 
the process first. Under the AIA, the patent in the situation described in Figure 
 
105 See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 146(1)(n), 125 Stat. 284, 
293 (2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
106 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (2012), (supplanted by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act in 
2011); Griffith v. Kanamaru, 816 F.2d 624, 625-29 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (applying first to invent 
priority rules). 
107 Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
35 U.S.C.); Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part I 
of II, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 435, 435 (2012) (stating that the AIA “arguably makes the most 
substantial changes to the law since those imposed by the Patent Act of 1836”). 
108 Still more precisely, the AIA awards patents to the first to invent and then either file or 
publicly disclose, whether by written description, commercial sale, or acts otherwise making 
the technology available to the public. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (stating that patent exists if 
invention is “patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or 
otherwise available to the public”). While forms of public disclosure other than filing can be 
used to establish priority, filing an application and the issuance of a patent by the U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) is still required for any patent rights to be awarded. 
109 Technically, exclusive rights vest upon the filing of a valid patent application 
(considered “constructive reduction to practice”). See  U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U.S. PATENT 
& TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2138.05(I) (2014). 
Alternatively, rights vest upon the publishing of an “enabling” disclosure, followed by timely 
filing within twelve months; an enabling disclosure is one that allows those skilled in the 
relevant art to make the invention without “undue experimentation.” See id. § 2164. On the 
relationship between invention-based rights and filing, see Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What 
Thomas Jefferson Thought About Patents? Reevaluating the Patent “Privilege” in Historical 
Context, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 953, 995-97 (2007). 
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3 would now go to Tesla rather than Edison because Tesla was the first to file a 
valid application.110 The AIA, in other words, can be seen as moving the U.S. 
patent system from a first-committed-searcher model to one representing a rule 
of capture. 
Protectability. The possessory timeline also speaks to the nature of what can 
be patented at all, even in the absence of a priority dispute. At a very basic level, 
the answer is that a patent must be issued by the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office (“USPTO”)—something that was true even before the AIA was 
enacted—and this in turn requires actual or constructive reduction to practice. 
But the choice described above between a first committed inventor and an actual 
capture approach can be illuminated further by situating it within a still-broader 
chronology. That chronology begins with the discovery of basic scientific truths, 
mathematical axioms, and other abstract principles; it proceeds through applied 
research either to find real-world uses for such knowledge or to apply such 
knowledge to solve known problems; it continues to the actual invention of a 
device or process having some practical and beneficial use; from there it 
proceeds to the perfection of the invention to generate a commercially desirable 
product; from there to production and marketing; and then it concludes with the 
sale or use of the invention and the enjoyment of whatever benefits it provides. 
Both the pre- and post-AIA regimes allow inventors to receive exclusive rights 
at points some distance removed from either end of that larger timeline.111 
One of the fundamental preconditions to patentability under U.S. patent law 
is that an invention be “useful,” a principle known as the utility requirement.112 
Patent law could adopt a rule allowing the award of exclusive rights as soon as 
a person comes to grasp a general principle that is likely to lead to one or more 
practical applications. It is hardly a stretch of the English language to say that, 
for instance, the idea of producing light by passing an electric current through a 
material with a moderately high level of electrical resistance is in some sense a 
“useful” one. Alternatively, patent law could condition the award of exclusive 
rights on actual commercial exploitation through the sale of a working product 
based on that information. On this view, an invention simply is not useful until 
it is actually put to real-world use of demonstrated value. Patent law adopts 
neither of these positions. Instead, it follows something of a middle course, 
 
110 Filing a complete and enabling application with the USPTO qualifies as constructive 
reduction to practice. See 35 U.S.C. § 100(i).  
111 In addition to the priority rules described here, the time bar in patent law makes 
patentability depend on filing for patent protection relatively early, even if there is no danger 
of being beaten by a competitor. See id. § 202(g).  
112 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (empowering Congress “[t]o promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries” (emphasis added)); 35 U.S.C. § 101 
(stating that patent may be granted to one who invents something “new and useful”). 
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requiring that a patent applicant demonstrate a non-speculative practical 
application for the invention.113 
This is a relatively minimal showing and makes it possible to receive a patent 
at a fairly preliminary stage, when more needs to be done before the patentee 
can benefit from the patent.114 Claimants do not need to show that an invention 
is commercially feasible or genuinely valuable,115 and often decades—
sometimes even centuries—pass before patents are commercialized in 
markets.116 Nor must a claimant obtain regulatory approvals necessary to make 
or sell an invention—a crucial consideration with pharmaceuticals.117 Nothing 
more is required to receive a patent, even under the AIA, once invention has 
occurred and been disclosed. 
That said, the patent system as a whole does have features that push awards 
further down the developmental timeline, a number of which have become more 
 
113 See ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 186 (6th ed. 2012) (explaining that invention 
must have purpose and be able to perform that purpose). 
114 “The threshold of utility is not high: An invention is ‘useful’ under section 101 if it is 
capable of providing some identifiable benefit.” Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 
F.3d 1364, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see also Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 
977 F.2d 1555, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“To violate § 101 the claimed device must be totally 
incapable of achieving a useful result . . . .”); Stiftung v. Renishaw PLC, 945 F.2d 1173, 1180 
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (“An invention need not be the best or the only way to accomplish a certain 
result, and it need only be useful to some extent and in certain applications . . . .”). 
115 See, e.g., E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Berkley & Co., 620 F.2d 1247, 1260 n.17 
(8th Cir. 1980) (“A small degree of utility is sufficient. The claimed invention must only be 
capable of performing some beneficial function. An invention does not lack utility merely 
because the particular embodiment disclosed in the patent lacks perfection or performs 
crudely. A commercially successful product is not required. Nor is it essential that the 
invention accomplish all its intended functions, or operate under all conditions, partial success 
being sufficient to demonstrate patentable utility. In short, the defense of non-utility cannot 
be sustained without proof of total incapacity.” (citations omitted)). Commercial success 
nevertheless does play an important role in many cases in showing that an invention satisfies 
the separate requirement of non-obviousness. Id. at 1263 (stating that commercial success 
might be utilized as secondary consideration to determine obviousness or non-obviousness). 
116 See Kitch, supra note 27, at 272 tbl.1 (showing that great stretches of time often pass 
before patent grant and its commercialization). 
117 See, e.g., In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“FDA approval, however, 
is not a prerequisite for finding a compound useful within the meaning of the patent laws. 
Usefulness in patent law, and in particular in the context of pharmaceutical inventions, 
necessarily includes the expectation of further research and development. The stage at which 
an invention in this field becomes useful is well before it is ready to be administered to 
humans. Were we to require Phase II testing in order to prove utility, the associated costs 
would prevent many companies from obtaining patent protection on promising new 
inventions, thereby eliminating an incentive to pursue, through research and development, 
potential cures in many crucial areas such as the treatment of cancer.” (citations omitted)). 
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pronounced of late. For one thing, while the utility requirement is generous, it 
has its limits.118 An invention must actually work to be considered useful, even 
if it need not work especially well.119 Moreover, the mere possibility, and 
perhaps even likelihood, that some use for an invention will later be discovered 
is insufficient to support a patent grant.120 In addition, the invention must have 
some demonstrated benefit, however slight. Significantly, the Supreme Court 
has held that a substance cannot be considered useful merely because it is an 
object of active research by scientists, who suspect it may have beneficial 
properties.121 This restriction, too, has been expanded upon and given more teeth 
in recent cases.122 So while patent law does award rights at an earlier stage in the 
overall developmental process than it might, it also contains rules that limit early 
awards. The utility requirement thus serves as a doctrinal tool that draws the line 
between information that is and is not subject to individual ownership.  
Other features of patent law also limit the availability of patents at very early 
stages of the inventive process. Under a set of long-standing judge-made 
exceptions to the statutory provision governing patentable subject-matter, 
abstract ideas and laws of nature, though often very valuable, are categorically 
excluded from patent protection.123 Only practical applications of such 
 
118 See Arti K. Rai, Fostering Cumulative Innovation in the Biopharmaceutical Industry: 
The Role of Patents and Antitrust, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 813, 839 (2001) (asserting that 
only utility requirement is particularly useful in determining how far removed research is from 
commercial end product to explain that strict interpretation of usefulness can be limiting). 
119 See Newman v. Quigg, 877 F.2d 1575, 1581-82 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (rejecting patent for 
perpetual motion device because it was inoperable and therefore lacked utility). 
120 See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 532-36 (1966) (explaining that patents should 
not be granted on speculation of future usefulness). 
121 Id. at 534-36 (“Unless and until a process is refined and developed to this point—where 
specific benefit exists in currently available form—there is insufficient justification for 
permitting an applicant to engross what may prove to be a broad field.”). 
122 See, e.g., In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (rejecting patent where all 
“asserted uses represent mere hypothetical possibilities”); see also Utility Examination 
Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1093 (proposed Jan. 5, 2001) (stating that “specific, 
substantial, and credible utility” is necessary to fulfill utility requirement). 
123 See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (“The laws of nature, physical 
phenomenon, and abstract ideas have been held not patentable.”); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 
584, 594 (1978) (“Even though a phenomenon of nature or mathematical formulation may be 
well known, an inventive application of the principle may be patented. Conversely, the 
discovery of such a phenomenon cannot support a patent unless there is some other inventive 
concept in its application.”); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) (“Phenomena of 
nature, though just discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not 
patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and technological work.”); Funk Bros. Seed 
Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) (“He who discovers a hitherto unknown 
phenomenon of nature has no claim to a monopoly of it which the law recognizes.”); O’Reilly 
v. Morse, 15 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 112-21 (1854) (explaining that one cannot patent use of 
steam, however developed, as motive power for particular purpose); Le Roy v. Tatham, 14 
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discoveries can be patented.124 In recent years, the Supreme Court has enforced 
this constraint with particular vigor.125 Other doctrines carry this principle 
further, so that even some ideas involving practical solutions to concrete 
problems are too far from practical success to be patentable. The specification 
of an invention in a patent application, for instance, must enable others to make 
and use the invention without resorting to “undue experimentation.”126 As a 
result, merely identifying the general form a solution to a problem will take 
without actually sorting out the details necessary to put the solution into action—
think of the example of the incandescent light bulb above—is inadequate.127 
The considerations that lie behind the various doctrines used to structure the 
timing of patent grants echo traditional thinking about first possession. 
Awarding an exclusive right to a compound merely because it may have 
beneficial properties could easily result in someone unable to discover its uses 
holding the right and impeding those who could do so. Generating the new 
substance is only half the battle; no rights in it will vest until at least some 
practical benefit has been discovered, apart from keeping labs busy. As the 
 
U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1853) (“A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an 
original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an 
exclusive right.”). 
124 See Parker, 437 U.S. at 594 (stating that inventive concept in application of 
phenomenon of nature may be patentable); Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 
306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939) (“While a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not 
patentable invention, a novel and useful structure created with the aid of knowledge of 
scientific truth may be.”). 
125 See Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354, 2360 (2014) (finding 
system and media claims “add nothing of substance to the underlying abstract idea” and 
therefore are patent ineligible); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 
S. Ct. 2107, 2117 (2013) (finding no patentable discovery when gene separated from 
surrounding genetic material); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 
66, 92 (2012) (finding application of natural law of relationship between concentration of 
metabolites in blood and likelihood thiopurine drug will be ineffective to merely claim 
underlying law of nature, and therefore be unpatentable); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 612 
(2010) (finding claims that “attempt to patent the use of the abstract idea of hedging risk in 
the energy market and then instruct the use of well-known analysis techniques to help 
establish some of the inputs into the equation” do not sufficiently add to underlying abstract 
principle). 
126 In such a case, for instance, the specification of the invention in the patent application 
will not enable others to make and use the invention without resorting to “undue 
experimentation.” See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012) (“The specification shall contain a written 
description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such 
full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it 
pertains . . . to make and use the same . . . .”); In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988) 
(“[E]xperimentation needed to practice the invention must not be undue experimentation.”). 
127 See Incandescent Lamp Patent, 159 U.S. 465, 475-77 (1895) (finding complainant not 
entitled to “monopoly of all fibrous and textile materials for incandescent conductors”). 
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Supreme Court explained it, “[A] patent is not a hunting license. It is not a 
reward for the search, but compensation for its successful conclusion.”128 The 
Court did not cite Pierson v. Post in making this pronouncement, but it might 
well have. A grant prior to the development of a practical application risks 
ending the race too soon. Those more capable of putting the compound to 
practical use may be prevented from doing so if it is already subject to patent’s 
exclusivity.129 
At the same time, an approach deeming the invention useful later in time—
upon commercialization, say—would create serious risks of either wasteful 
duplication of effort or lost investment, undercutting much of the incentive to 
obtain patent protection and, by hypothesis, to innovate in the first place.130 In 
the pharmaceutical context, for instance, moving from the search for some 
practical application to commercialization requires clinical trials, a process that 
often takes around five to seven years and involves a cost that usually exceeds 
the preceding research.131 If usefulness depended on crossing these additional 
thresholds, it is more likely that pharmaceutical companies would be deterred 
from joining the race to develop new drugs since there would be a greater 
likelihood of losing a considerable investment if another company manages to 
 
128 Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 536 (1966). Note that while the first to invent rule 
of priority, in place when Brenner was decided, would grant the exclusive right to the party 
who started the chase slightly earlier than its competitor, the utility requirement sets the 
location of the utility bar in patent law on the broader invention procurement timeline. 
129 A similar point can be made about improvements to patented inventions. If those who 
discovered improvements on existing technology were precluded from obtaining patent 
protection for them, in effect by granting a complete patent right to the holder of the original 
patent at the moment of its issuance, the contest to develop such improvements might be 
ended too soon. See Mark A. Lemley, Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property 
Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1000-10 (1997) (explaining that trying to improve existing 
invention is integral to competitive process and that improvers must avoid literal scope of 
patent claims); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent 
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 872-77 (1990) (“If a property right on a basic invention covers 
a host of potential improvements, the property right holder can be expected to develop the 
basic invention and some of the improvements. But we would expect a single rightholder to 
underdevelop—or even ignore totally—many of the potential improvements encompassed by 
their broad property right.”). 
130 See Duffy, supra note 15, at 445 (explaining that allowing “patenting prior to the bulk 
of the investment needed to bring the innovation to market” makes competition more efficient 
by “ensuring that the predominant private cost of patent racing is not the premature 
expenditure of resources on developing the innovation or the duplication of innovative 
efforts”). 
131 See Joseph A. DiMasi, Ronald W. Hansen & Henry G. Grabowski, The Price of 
Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 167 (2003) 
(finding that clinical testing costs outweigh preclinical research costs per approved new drug). 
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complete the lengthy and expensive commercialization process more quickly.132 
A grant of exclusive rights somewhat before or around the conclusion of the 
applied research phase, as current doctrine allows, promises the inventor the 
right to pursue the inventive process through commercialization without the 
danger of losing this investment.133 Broadly speaking, patent doctrine strikes a 
plausible balance between the dangers of early grants and the dangers of late 
ones along the R&D chronology. 
B. Trademark  
Priority. Trademark law is a system based upon temporal priority—
conflicting claims to the same mark are resolved using a first-in-time 
principle.134 As is characteristic of such systems, parties often compete in a race 
to own trademarks.135 That first-in-time principle applies to the conduct of rival 
claimants: trademark rights generally go to the first to use a distinctive136 mark 
in commerce.137 This requirement has two elements: use and distinctiveness. 
Requiring “use” of a trademark has a fairly clear connection to possession.138 
Possession is the basic precondition of use, and to use a resource is almost 
 
132 Id. at 468-71 (detailing how probabilities will impact motivations for companies to 
enter race for developing given innovation). 
133 See In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“Were we to require Phase II 
testing in order to prove utility, the associated costs would prevent many companies from 
obtaining patent protection on promising new inventions, thereby eliminating an incentive to 
pursue, through research and development, potential cures in many crucial areas such as the 
treatment of cancer.”). 
134 See 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c) (2012) (stating that filing application to register mark confers 
right of priority except against person who had previously used or applied to register the 
mark). 
135 See Zazu Designs v. L’Oreal, S.A., 979 F.2d 499, 503 (7th Cir. 1992) (“[O]ne must win 
the race to the marketplace to establish the exclusive right to a mark.”). 
136 See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9-10 (2d Cir. 1976) 
(expounding concept of distinctiveness). 
137 See Lanham Act § 1(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a) (providing trademark registration for mark 
“used in commerce”); U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRADEMARK MANUAL OF 
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 900 (2018) (allowing for registration of trademark only if 
application includes verified statement that mark was in use in commerce as of filing date). 
But see Lanham Act § 1(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b) (allowing for registration of mark based on 
“intent-to-use” within six months of filing). 
138 See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Allen & Wheeler Co., 208 F. 513, 516 (7th Cir. 1913) 
(detailing that trademark infringement does not damage trademark, but instead damages trade 
and business by removing trademark’s meaning in use); FRANCIS H. UPTON, A TREATISE ON 
THE LAW OF TRADE MARKS WITH A DIGEST AND REVIEW OF THE ENGLISH AND AMERICAN 
AUTHORITIES 10 (1860) (“[P]roperty in trade marks, exclusive and absolute, has existed and 
been recognized as a legal possession, which may be bought, and sold, and transmitted, from 
the earliest days of our recorded jurisprudence.”). 
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axiomatically to possess it.139 Trademark law’s requirement of possession is thus 
implicit in the use requirement: only one who has seized upon a distinctive mark 
as the emblem of her business or its product can use it as its trademark.140  
The distinctiveness requirement adds a conceptual wrinkle. Distinctiveness 
refers to a characteristic of the mark, namely its capacity to designate the source 
of goods and services.141 Protectable marks fall into two different categories. 
Some are considered inherently distinctive because they are either wholly 
invented, as with “fanciful” marks like Exxon, or because they do not refer to 
any particular characteristic of the products they are associated, as with 
“arbitrary” marks, like Apple for computers.142 For these sorts of marks, 
trademark protection begins as soon as they are used in commerce. Other marks, 
however, require more. Most notably, a mark will be considered descriptive if it 
connotes some characteristic of the product or service it pertains to, such as 
Holiday Inn used in connection with hotels.143 Descriptive marks are not 
considered inherently distinctive and can only be protected if and when they 
have “acquired distinctiveness,” often referred to as having obtained “secondary 
meaning.”144 In essence, this requires that consumers who encounter the mark 
recognize that in addition to any dictionary meaning or descriptive quality—
vacation lodgings in the case of Holiday Inn—the term also designates a specific 
 
139 The commercial aspect of the necessary use is arguably inherent in the nature of 
trademarks. Trademarks are commercial emblems, and thus the kind of use that is relevant is 
use as a way of designating commercial products. See Hanover Star Milling Co., 208 F. at 
515 (“Use of an arbitrary and distinctive mark to indicate the origin or ownership of articles 
of trade—the dealer’s ‘commercial signature’—is very old.”). 
140 See id. at 515-16 (stating that “the property or right in the trade is protected from injury 
by preventing a fraud-doer from stealing the complainant’s trade by means of using the 
complainant’s ‘commercial signature’”). 
141 See Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 8-9 (explaining that mark is distinct if it 
comes to identify company, not the product, because competitors cannot be deprived of 
calling product by its name). 
142 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (stating that “the owner of a famous mark that is distinctive, 
inherently or through acquired distinctiveness” is entitled to injunctive relief if someone 
causes dilution of mark); Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 11 n.17 (“[T]he term 
‘fanciful,’ as a classifying concept, is usually applied to words invented solely for their use as 
trademarks. When the same legal consequences attach to a common word, i.e., when it is 
applied in an unfamiliar way, the use is called ‘arbitrary.’”). This also includes “suggestive” 
marks, like Sunkist as applied to oranges, that may imply something about a product but stop 
short of actually describing it. See Stix Prods., Inc. v. United Merchs. & Mfrs., Inc., 295 F. 
Supp. 479, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (“A term is suggestive if it requires imagination, thought and 
perception to reach a conclusion as to the nature of goods.”). 
143 See Stix Prods., Inc., 295 F. Supp. at 488. 
144 See Lanham Act § 2(f), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (prohibiting registration of descriptive 
marks unless acquired distinctiveness has been shown); In re Hehr Mfg. Co., 279 F.2d 526, 
528 (C.C.P.A. 1960) (requiring that “unless a design is inherently distinctive it is registrable 
only if sufficient evidence is presented to show it has acquired secondary meaning”). 
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brand.145 Secondary meaning can develop over a period of time in which the 
public gets to meet the mark in market settings such as on products and services 
and in advertisement. So far as trademark law is concerned, a descriptive term 
or symbol simply is not a trademark until secondary meaning has been 
acquired.146 In this way, the treatment of descriptive marks also aligns with the 
rule of capture model. 
Over time, there have been some adjustments to this basic model. Trademark 
law has come to embrace elements of a first-committee-searcher model. In 1988, 
Congress moved away from its mandatory prerequisite of actual use in 
commerce. For the first time, it allowed parties, in the alternative, to reserve 
exclusive rights to marks based on a mere “intent to use” them in commerce.147 
By filing an “intent to use” application, a party intending on adopting a mark 
within six months (a period that can be extended up to three years, if the 
applicant files periodically with the USPTO and affirms that she maintains a 
bona fide intention to use the mark)148 can protect itself against another who has 
actually adopted a confusingly similar mark in commerce during that period. 
This exclusivity depends on the applicant retaining its intent to use and is 
conditioned on the eventual use of the mark in commerce. If the applicant fails 
to use the mark in commerce within the relevant time period, the trademark 
becomes free for others to adopt.149 Thus, this statutory amendment adds a first-
committed-searcher track to claiming a trademark. For trademarks, as with 
sperm whales, the prey becomes available for others to pursue if the hunter fails 
to maintain pursuit. Claiming an intent to use thus signifies a change of approach 
regarding priority disputes. Trademark law has evolved to allow first committed 
pursuers of particular trademarks to shift the rule governing priority disputes to 
a first-committed-searcher rule by filing an intent to use application and putting 
all potentially competing pursuers on notice. They can secure property rights at 
a relatively early point along the propertization timeline, thus enabling 
themselves to end the race early and establish priority to a mark before any 
 
145 Secondary meaning requires a showing “that the primary significance of the term in the 
minds of the consuming public is not the product but the producer.” Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l 
Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 118 (1938). The requirement of secondary meaning applies to a 
broad range of marks, including descriptive marks, surname marks, sensory marks (sound, 
sight, scent, or color marks), some geographical marks, and product configuration trade dress. 
146 See Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 10 (stating descriptive terms may be 
trademarked where demonstrated to be distinctive of producer’s product in commerce). 
147 See Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1128. The Act became 
effective on November 16, 1989. To some extent, this change may have curtailed what was 
in effect a more generous understanding of actual use sufficient to confer priority. 
148 See 37 C.F.R. § 2.89 (2018) (allowing “[e]xtensions of time for filing a statement of 
use”). 
149 See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(d) (requiring applicant to submit statement that mark has been 
used in commerce within six months of notice of allowance). 
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commercial use takes place.150 Just like in the case of sperm whales, doing so 
protects the first committed pursuer against third party intervention—which may 
involve free-riding—in the hunting process.  
Along similar lines, the rise of the “analogous use” doctrine in trademark law 
signals a move away from a rule of capture approach and toward a first-
committed-searcher model when it comes to priority disputes among competing 
pursuers. The analogous use doctrine allows trademark developers to claim 
priority based on certain activities that make the mark known to the consuming 
public—such as widespread preannouncement of a product in advertisement that 
uses the mark—occurring before actual use in commerce of the good or 
service.151 Like intent-to-use applications, the doctrine of analogous use 
guarantees a first committed pursuer of a mark—who might be engaging in 
prerelease promotional use—priority over a second-comer who is the first to 
actually use the mark in commerce.  
In the case of descriptive marks, however, trademark doctrine moved in the 
other direction, pushing priority disputes away from a first-committed-searcher 
rule towards a rule of capture. Since descriptive marks require the development 
of secondary meaning, which is often a lengthy process, the possibility of 
simultaneous adoption is pronounced. Priority disputes similar to the sort 
described for patent law in Figure 3 arise frequently with descriptive marks.152 
Imagine a situation in which Firm A decides to adopt a descriptive term as a 
trademark and begins using it in commerce. Firm B subsequently decides to use 
the same term as its own trademark and then manages to acquire secondary 
meaning first, while Firm A is still working toward that goal. Between the two, 
who should have an exclusive right to the mark, the one who first used the 
descriptive term in commerce in a trademark-like way or the one who was the 
second to use, but the first to achieve secondary meaning? 
At one time, some courts and commentators advanced the idea that Firm A 
should be protected against Firm B’s use, so long as Firm A’s secondary meaning 
 
150 Id. § 1051(b) (offering protection for six months, and possibly up to three years, before 
actual use in commerce as long as there is a bona fide intent to use). 
151 See, e.g., Md. Stadium Auth. v. Becker, 806 F. Supp. 1236, 1239 (D. Md. 1992) (stating 
that “sale of goods or services using an unregistered mark is not necessary to establish use of 
the mark” and that under certain conditions advertising and promotion may suffice); Shalom 
Children’s Wear, Inc. v. In-Wear A/S, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1516, 1519 (T.T.A.B. 1993) (“Use 
analogous to trademark use . . . is nontechnical use of a trademark in connection with the 
promotion or sale of a product under circumstances which do not provide a basis for an 
application to register . . . . [S]uch use has consistently been held sufficient use to establish 
priority rights as against subsequent users of the same or similar marks.”). 
152 See, e.g., U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PROTECTING YOUR TRADEMARK: 
ENHANCING YOUR RIGHTS THROUGH FEDERAL REGISTRATION 14 (2016) (explaining that 
applicant may have strong rights to priority based on long use and may be able to intervene 
in opposition proceeding if applicant’s rights are stronger than another applicant who applied 
first). 
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was “in the making.”153 In a sense, they applied a first-committed-searcher rule 
to the first possession of descriptive marks: if Firm A was the first to start 
pursuing secondary meaning in a descriptive term, and remained committed to 
that goal, it would prevail over Firm B, who adopted the term later and then 
grabbed the secondary meaning from under Firm A’s hands. In other words, they 
followed the model advocated by the Pierson v. Post dissent and adopted, for 
among others, sperm whales and patentable inventions prior to the AIA. Others, 
however, held that in these circumstances, rights in the mark should go to Firm 
B, the party who was second to join the race yet first to acquire secondary 
meaning in the mark.154 This approach can be said to follow the conception of 
first possession grounded in actual capture: rights in a descriptive mark go to the 
first claimant to actually acquire secondary meaning for the mark, not just to set 
out and try to do so. Support for the secondary meaning in the making doctrine 
eventually dissipated and today courts award priority to the first party to 
complete the process of acquiring secondary meaning, regardless of whether 
they were the first to begin trying.155 
Protectability. Trademark law involves choices about the timing of rights not 
simply in the sense of determining which of two essentially simultaneous 
competitors will receive trademark protection, but also the rights a trademark 
holder will receive against remote and future rivals. For one thing, trademark 
law has long given trademark holders priority not only within the confines of the 
current geographic and product markets in which their marks are used but also 
in those in which they are likely to expand.156 A similar issue concerns the type 
of protection received. The cornerstone of classical trademark law, for instance, 
is protection against “consumer confusion,” meaning that consumers 
erroneously select the wrong product, or at least have a harder time ascertaining 
which of two products is the one they want. Generally speaking, trademark law 
 
153 See Jolly Good Indus., Inc. v. Elegra Inc., 690 F. Supp. 227, 230-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) 
(finding where secondary meaning is in making a mark will be protected against intentional 
infringers); Metro Kane Imports, Ltd. v. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 625 F. Supp. 313, 318 
(S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d sub nom. Metro Kane Imports v. Brookstone Co., 800 F.2d 1128 (2d 
Cir. 1986) (explaining secondary meaning doctrine derives support from second comer 
doctrine, which states senior user has right not to have second comer intentionally cause 
confusion); 3 RUDOLF CALLMAN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND 
MONOPOLIES 356-57 (3d ed. 1971) (“A mark with secondary meaning in-the-making should 
also be protected, at least against those who appropriate it with knowledge or good reason to 
know of its potential in that regard, or with an intent to capitalize on its goodwill.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
154 See, e.g., Cicena Ltd. v. Columbia Telecomms. Grp., 900 F.2d 1546, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 
1990). 
155 See Zatarain’s, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 791 (5th Cir. 1983) 
(citing cases where acquiring secondary meaning established trademark rights). 
156 See, e.g., AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 349 (9th Cir. 1979) (listing 
likelihood of expansion of product lines trademark infringement factor). 
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does not protect against all uses of a word or other source signifier, but only 
against those that involve its use as a trademark within the relevant market 
context.157 In recent years, however, trademark protection has expanded in a 
number of ways, such as protection against uses that are likely to mislead with 
respect to sponsorship or endorsement.158 Still other provisions of trademark law 
expand protection in other ways having to do with the contest over what 
precisely trademark law allows to be claimed. Perhaps most notably, the Anti-
Cybersquatting Act gives trademark-holders special rights in domain names 
incorporating their trademarks.159  
These are all examples of a particular kind of shift away from a rule of actual 
capture toward earlier claiming. They reflect ways in which trademark law 
allows “capturing” one thing—a particular trademark in a particular market—to 
trigger an award of rights in something else that has not itself been captured. It 
is like awarding title to fishery by virtue of having caught one of the fish within 
it. In this sense, they represent an early claiming approach to the award of 
trademark rights. 
Trademark law also showcases another potentially useful dynamic of 
institutional design where possessory rules are concerned. The basic model we 
have depicted so far is essentially binary, but it is possible to use additional 
points on the developmental timeline to confer additional rights. Trademark 
protection is strengthened in various ways for holders of marks who have 
completed steps beyond simple capture. For example, one of the factors used to 
assess likelihood of confusion,160 the lynchpin of trademark infringement, is the 
strength of a trademark.161 Trademark doctrine explicitly makes it easier for 
 
157 Id. at 350 (identifying product market, price, and proximity as factors used to determine 
infringement). 
158 Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012) (listing as 
actionable confusion with respect to affiliation, sponsorship or approval). 
159 Id. (creating cause of action against registration or use of domain name confusingly 
similar to trademark). Relatedly, respecting the priority element of first possession, the Anti-
Cybersquatting Act also grants a trademark holder a superior claim to a website address even 
though someone else was the first to claim and use it, if that use was not made in good faith. 
See id. §1125(d)(1)(A)(i) (giving right of action for bad faith intent to profit from protected 
mark similar to domain name). 
160 See Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d at 348-49 (setting forth non-exhaustive eight-factor test 
to determine likelihood of confusion between marks). 
161 For marks that are not inherently distinctive, strength is measured in terms of the degree 
of secondary meaning that has been acquired. See Star Indus. v. Bacardi & Co., 412 F.3d 373, 
381 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Alternatively, even if not inherently distinctive, the mark may be 
distinctive by virtue of having acquired a ‘secondary meaning’ in the minds of consumers.”); 
Timothy Denny Greene & Jeff Wilkerson, Understanding Trademark Strength, 16 STAN. 
TECH. L. REV. 535, 539 (2013) (identifying brand strength as separate from trademark 
strength). 
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owners of stronger marks to show infringement.162 Anti-dilution law provides 
an even clearer example of this tendency. In 1996, Congress amended the 
Lanham Act to confer rights against having one’s trademark “diluted” by 
someone else’s, even if the other person’s mark does not create any confusion 
in the minds of consumers as classic trademark principles require.163 But this 
protection is available only for “famous” marks164 and requires widespread 
brand recognition among the general consuming public.165 It goes well beyond 
the level of consumer recognition and mental association sufficient to establish 
secondary meaning for descriptive marks, for which recognition among a 
smaller subset of consumers is sufficient.166 To use the hunt analogy, before 
rights against dilution will be awarded, trademark law requires not just capture 
but something like outright slaughter. Upon the pursuer’s reaching a later point 
in time in the chase chronology—the point of fame, or equivalently, upon 
meeting a higher standard of performance regarding the trademark, trademark 
law awards the pursuer additional property. With greater possession, one might 
say, come greater rights. Note that rights against trademark dilution do not 
involve the priority element of first possession, but only the protectability aspect. 
In dilution settings, there is typically only one potential claimant who can argue 
for nationwide fame in a particular mark, and trademark dilution doctrine 
controls the award of property rights even in the absence of any actual ownership 
race.167 
A similar point can be made about trademark registration. Priority in 
trademark law has traditionally been geographical as well, not only temporal.168 
Rights in unregistered trademarks go to the first to use a distinctive mark in 
 
162 Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, 537 F.2d 4, 10 (2d Cir. 1976) (“The term 
which is descriptive but not generic stands on a better basis.”). 
163 Federal Anti-Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125, 1127) (“The term ‘dilution’ means the lessening of the 
capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services.”). 
164 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (c)(1) (granting dilution protection respecting “famous” marks); id. 
§ 1125(c)(2) (defining when mark is famous and detailing facts to consider). 
165 See id. § 1125(c)(2)(B) (listing “degree of recognition of the famous mark” as factor in 
determining whether another mark is likely to cause dilution by blurring). 
166 See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
(identifying consumer studies as factor for consideration of whether mark has attained 
secondary meaning). 
167 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (noting that burden of proof in dilution claim first requires 
proving fame). 
168 See Thomas J. Carroll & Son Co. v. McIlvaine & Baldwin, 183 F. 22, 26-28 (2d Cir. 
1910) (denying trademark protection for plaintiff in New York but recognizing protection 
rights in Baltimore); Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1889 (2007) (“Other parties had the right, however, to use a mark 
in other markets in which the senior user had not labored.”). 
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commerce in a particular geographical area.169 For example, as between a New 
York user and a California user of the same unregistered mark, the rights to the 
mark in Kansas go to the first to use the mark in commerce there. Federal 
registration of marks, however, establishes nationwide constructive use, 
conferring priority in all geographical markets, including those where the mark 
has not yet been used.170 Registration can thus be seen as awarding an exclusive 
nationwide right at an early time, one that is prior to actually using the mark in 
each and every jurisdiction. So while it is true that trademark law generally 
requires actual use, which is akin to actual capture, to establish priority, the 
availability of registration allows claiming earlier in time in new geographic 
markets, thus giving the registrant the exclusive right to complete the nationwide 
chase uninterrupted.  
C. Copyright 
Priority. On its face, copyright law does not appear to entail a priority-based 
system akin to those in patent and trademark law. Copyright only protects 
against copying; a copyright-holder cannot sue a second-comer who 
independently generated a similar, or even identical, work.171 But appearances 
can be deceiving, and there is a more substantial priority element in copyright 
law than is often realized. Suppose Picasso and Peter separately produce highly 
similar paintings and it is undisputed that Picasso’s was painted a year before 
Peter’s. In theory, Peter should not be liable for copyright infringement because 
he created his work independently. In practice, however, he may have a hard 
time making his case in court. Were Picasso to sue Peter, the court would have 
no crystal ball to determine whether this was a case of independent creation or 
copying. The court would likely resolve the case—as courts usually do—using 
circumstantial evidence by looking to the degree of access Peter had to Picasso’s 
work and the similarity between the two works.172 The more accessible Picasso’s 
painting was to Peter and the more similar Peter’s work is to Picasso’s, the more 
plausible the inference that the similarities between the two resulted from 
 
169 See Stone Creek, Inc. v. Omnia Italian Design, Inc., 875 F.3d 426, 436 (9th Cir. 2017) 
(“[C]ommon-law trademark rights extend only to the territory where a mark is known and 
recognized, so a later user may sometimes acquire rights in pockets geographically remote 
from the first user’s territory.”). 
170 Even holders of unregistered marks, moreover, enjoy priority in markets where 
expansion is considered natural or likely. See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 
U.S. 90, 99-103 (1918); Hannover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 405-09 (1917).  
171 See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936) (“[I]f by 
some magic a man who had never known it were to compose anew Keats’s Ode on a Grecian 
Urn, he would be an ‘author,’ and, if he copyrighted it, others might not copy that poem, 
though they might of course copy Keats’s.”). 
172 See, e.g., Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468-69 (2d Cir. 1946) (expounding on use 
of circumstantial evidence in copyright infringement cases). 
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copying. Creators of commercially successful or other widely distributed works 
are thus often able to show that the creator of a later-produced work had access 
to their own earlier work.173 The more widely distributed the earlier work is, the 
greater the likelihood that courts will conclude that the alleged infringer actually 
encountered the work,174 whether she actually did so or not. Thus, in practice, 
priority plays an important role in copyright law. 
Note that in addition to the formal law of copyright, copyright-like rules also 
develop in the informal context of social norms. Indeed, as a driver of economic 
and social value, priority may be of the utmost importance, even without any 
particular emphasis or importance under formal law. As between two authors—
standup comedians, for example—the first to publish or reach the market is 
likely to get most of the acclaim or profit, even when the second-comer who 
created independently cannot be accused of formal copyright infringement.175 
As a practical matter, a later independent creator will often reap no substantial 
reputational or financial benefit from her work.176 For these economic and social 
reasons as well, copyright law involves a substantial element of priority. 
The award of copyrights follows what can be thought of as a rule of capture.177 
Under copyright law as it stands today, copyright protection essentially turns on 
two requirements. First, a work must be “fixed in any tangible medium of 
expression,”178 meaning that it is embodied in physical form—written down, 
 
173 See Baxter v. MCA, Inc., 812 F.2d 421, 423 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Because direct evidence 
of copying is rarely available, a plaintiff may establish copying by circumstantial evidence 
of: (1) defendant’s access to the copyrighted work prior to the creation of defendant’s work, 
and (2) substantial similarity of both general ideas and expression between the copyrighted 
work and the defendant’s work.”). 
174 Access is itself indirect evidence of exposure to the work. It is very hard to avoid 
concluding that copying has occurred if the second creator actually knew the earlier work: 
one cannot dream up an idea that one already has in mind, so unless a person has forgotten 
something to which they were exposed before producing their own work, actual exposure will 
tend to rule out the possibility of independent creation. 
175 See Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, There’s No Free Laugh (Anymore): The 
Emergence of Intellectual Property Norms and the Transformation of Stand-Up Comedy, 94 
VA. L. REV. 1787, 1826-27 (2008) (noting that under informal norm system among standup 
comedians, ownership of joke goes to first to tell it publicly, notwithstanding formal copyright 
of second comedian who created it independently). 
176 See Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, 
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 299-308 (1970) 
(demonstrating different benefits to first creator, and also that even without copyright law 
second copier may reap no benefits due to powerful position that first to reach market 
possesses). 
177 See Drassinower, supra note 33, at 191 (“Because it specifies the mode of acquisition 
in copyright law, the originality requirement is analogous to the requirement of first 
possession or occupation in property law.”). 
178 See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
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filmed, painted, printed, and so on.179 This requires a considerable degree of 
specificity and completeness, consistent with a rule of capture. Only those works 
that have been completed, in the sense of actually being recorded and preserved 
in material form, are protectable.180 Second, a work must be original.181 This 
does not require uniqueness, but it does require that the work either be created 
independently of any identical work or that it depart from any materials from 
which it borrows in a way that includes a minimal exercise of creativity.182 So 
while pure copying will not support copyright protection, courts do not inquire 
into the aesthetic or expressive merit of a work.183 Similar to the patent law’s 
generous utility requirement, copyright requires that a claimant produce a work 
having some creative element, but it need not represent a significant commercial 
or artistic accomplishment.184 It is possible to imagine a system in which the 
award of rights was delayed beyond mere capture—to publication, for instance, 
or a demonstration that a work is either a commercial success or a source of 
substantial social value. And to the extent copying is assessed by considering 
how widely the work has been distributed, priority as a practical matter is to 
some extent resolved in this way. But generally speaking, copyright law 
corresponds with an ordinary capture model, requiring that the work be in hand, 
but not that it be cultivated or put to use.185 
Protectability. Timing issues are also affected in important ways by a variety 
of rules and principles that shape the scope of copyright protection. One critical 
issue involves the assignment of rights to derivative works. A derivative work is 
a creation based upon one or more underlying copyrightable works, such as a 
 
179 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 460-61 (1984) 
(acknowledging fixed physical form to be sufficient prerequisite to copyright protection). 
180 An earlier draft of a work can be protected under copyright law, however, as though it 
were a final edition. 
181 See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in 
original works of authorship . . . .”). 
182 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (“Original, as 
the term is used in copyright, means only that the work was independently created by the 
author (as opposed to copied from other works), and that it possesses at least some minimal 
degree of creativity.”). 
183 See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (“It would be 
a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final 
judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious 
limits.”). 
184 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc., 499 U.S. at 363 (“As a constitutional matter, copyright protects 
only those constituent elements of a work that possess more than a de minimis quantum of 
creativity.”). 
185 Cf. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228-29 (1990) (stating that “nothing in the 
copyright statutes would prevent an author from hoarding all of his works during the term of 
the copyright”). 
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translation, a sequel, a movie version of a book, or an abridgement.186 Here, 
copyright law has done an about-face. Until at least the mid-nineteenth century, 
rights to derivative works were often assigned to those who produced them and 
were awarded only after they had been produced. A famous 1853 case, for 
example, decided that the copyright to a German translation of Uncle Tom’s 
Cabin belonged to the person who was first to actually produce that translation, 
rather than to Harriett Beecher Stowe.187 At that time, copyright law awarded 
rights to derivative works using a rule of capture.188 Translations were treated, 
in essence, like right whales: the first person to create a translation would have 
a copyright in their translation (though another independent translator would 
have a copyright in whatever translation they produced).189 Copyright in 
translations attached only when the translation was completed. Under modern 
copyright law, however, rights to derivative works belong to the author of the 
underlying original work.190 Ownership of derivative works is established when 
the original, not the derivative work is produced.191 The author of the underlying 
original enjoys the exclusive right—secured for the limited time of the duration 
of the copyright in the original—to complete the chase for any follow-on 
creations, uninterrupted. So far as derivative works are concerned, copyright law 
awards rights very early, at the point an author has created the underlying work 
upon which the derivative is based.192 
Outside the context of derivative works, however, copyright law generally 
resists such early stage awards. Copyright doctrine determines the point (on the 
continuum of actions necessary to produce and disseminate a creative work) at 
which an author is deemed to be in possession of the work, having made enough 
progress for copyright protection to attach. In copyright infringement cases, the 
critical question is often whether the plaintiff came into possession at all, and 
thus ownership, of the allegedly infringed elements in her work. The chief 
principle of copyright law directed to this question is embodied in the so-called 
 
186 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining derivative works). 
187 See Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201, 201-08 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 13,514) 
(holding that translation is not copying). 
188 It was not until the Copyright Act of 1976 that derivative works were granted 
protection. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 103, 90 Stat. 2541, 2545 (codified 
at 17 U.S.C. § 103) (extending copyright protection to limited derivative works). 
189 See Stowe, 23 F. Cas. at 207-08 (dismissing notion of copyright covering translation as 
ridiculous). 
190 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (asserting that original copyright holder has right “to prepare 
derivative works based upon the copyrighted work”). 
191 See id. (asserting that completion of original work triggers rights in derivative works); 
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT IN DERIVATIVE WORKS AND COMPILATIONS 2 (2013), 
https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ14.pdf [https://perma.cc/B3HX-TCBH] (“Only the 
owner of copyright in a work has the right to prepare, or to authorize someone else to create, 
an adaptation of that work.”). 
192 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (asserting that original creator has right to prepare derivatives). 
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idea-expression dichotomy. It is black-letter law that copyright law does not 
protect “ideas,” only original expressions of them.193 While the “idea-expression 
dichotomy” seems to posit dichotomous categories, in practice the doctrine 
acknowledges that idea and expression are opposing ends of a metaphorical 
spectrum, and that between lies a wide and often rather murky borderland. The 
classic test distinguishing unprotectable idea from protectable expression was 
set out by Judge Learned Hand, in a case dealing with an original stage play and 
an allegedly infringing movie having certain plot similarities: 
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns of 
increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident 
is left out. . . . there is a point in this series of abstractions where they are 
no longer protected, since otherwise the playwright could prevent the use 
of his “ideas,” to which, apart from their expression, his property is never 
extended.194 
Hand’s Levels of Abstraction test, as it has come to be called, can be reframed 
in terms of our now-familiar possessory continuum. A playwright sets out to 
write a play. She starts out with an abstract and preliminary motivating idea, and 
as she moves further along the creation path she develops the plot scene after 
scene, adding detail—such as names, times, places, and characters—and 
gradually making her idea less abstract and more concrete. Somewhere along 
this continuum of increasing concretization lies the point at which expression is 
distinguished from idea. Any version of the work lying to the “left” of that point 
would be regarded by copyright doctrine as an abstract idea, free for the 
taking.195 Any version of the work lying to its “right” is regarded by copyright 
doctrine as an original expression, subject to possession and thus property, and 
whose copying may trigger liability for infringement. The point at which an 
author passes from idea to expression is copyright’s equivalent of capture. Up 
to that point, the work of authorship is still evanescent. But as the author moves 
across the borderline between idea and expression, she has completed the chase 
and has established her property right.196 
Like the utility doctrine and the abstract idea exclusion from patentable 
subject-matter, copyright’s idea-expression dichotomy seeks to ensure that 
protection is awarded only after the completion of substantial steps along the 
developmental timeline. In some cases, the real breakthrough—the hardest part 
to achieve and the source of the greatest overall value—may lie in the general 
 
193 See id. § 102(b) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work of 
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, 
principle, or discovery . . . .”). 
194 See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930). 
195 See, e.g., Idema v. Dreamworks, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1185 (C.D. Cal. 2001) 
(rejecting use of earlier drafts of screenplay to establish infringement). 
196 See Edward Samuels, The Idea-Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law, 56 TENN. L. 
REV. 321, 341 (1989) (discussing “abstraction test” for explaining nature of idea-expression 
dichotomy (citing Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121)). 
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concept. One writer or musician’s work may spawn an entire genre of 
subsequent works, a creative style, or a go-to technique. But the view taken in 
copyright is that this is not sufficient. A genre cannot exist on its own, without 
works embodying it concretely, and it is only when those works are completed 
that protection arises. Only an author actually in possession of a specific, 
concrete expression of a general idea can claim copyright protection. 
III. GRASPING POSSESSION 
 
This Article has thus far shown that IP doctrines can be analogized to first 
possession rules, both conceptually and in terms of their underlying functional 
foundations. This Part now explores implications. The previously described 
framework suggests ways to think about some pressing current questions in 
intellectual property and to evaluate the way the law has developed in recent 
years. In the discussion that follows, this Part begins by looking at several 
specific IP rules and policies that affect the initial award of IP rights. Outlining 
an integrative and prescriptive analysis of original acquisition in intellectual 
property across doctrinal boundaries, this Part offers some broader observations 
about the challenges of intellectual property and its relationship to the institution 
of property. 
A. Doctrinal Implications  
1. Patent Trolls: Of Abstract Ideas and Inter Partes Review 
Much patent law and policy in recent years has centered on perceived 
problems associated with the phenomena variously referred to as patent assertion 
entities (“PAEs”), non-practicing entities, or, most pejoratively, patent trolls. 
There is some disagreement about how exactly to define a patent “troll” and 
what the trouble with them actually is. The major concern with PAEs, one that 
was discussed by the Supreme Court, is that they profit by wielding hold-out 
leverage in cases where the patent at issue covers a relatively insignificant aspect 
of a much larger product, a problem that is particularly serious when notice of 
the patent was inadequate during the process of product development.197 
Another line of criticism associates patent trolling with nuisance or strike suits, 
where defendants settle infringement actions involving “weak” or bad patents 
simply because it is cheaper than litigating.198 While some highlight certain 
 
197 See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (suggesting injunctive relief should be denied “[w]hen the patented invention is 
but a small component of the product the companies seek to produce and the threat of an 
injunction is employed simply for undue leverage in negotiations”). 
198 See id. at 397 (noting “potential vagueness and suspect validity” of some business 
method patents). 
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social benefits associated with PAEs,199 a recent study by the Federal Trade 
Commission voiced concerns about the business model of litigation-reliant 
PAEs, which tend to obtain litigation settlements that “might be considered 
nuisance value.”200 
The aforementioned major concern with PAEs can be understood within the 
framework developed here: it is simply the problem of premature allocation of 
patent rights. As discussed above, a danger in early awards of property rights is 
that they may be given to parties who are initially leading the chase but who are 
eventually incapable of completing it successfully. As mentioned, such early 
misallocations involve subsequent transaction costs, in this case the cost of 
licensing the patents, under the threat and cost of pending litigation, to practicing 
entities who have often developed the same technology independently. The costs 
further involve the taxing of, or disincentivizing of, the activity of such capable, 
practicing entities. The proper solution to patent trolling is therefore pushing the 
moment of the patent grant to a later stage by requiring the performance of 
further steps along the patent’s prospect before exclusive rights are granted. The 
natural and preferred way to do so doctrinally would be to invigorate the utility 
prerequisite to patentability, which is currently very low. Unfortunately, the 
legal system has treated the problem only symptomatically thus far.  
The legal system has responded to concerns about patent trolls in at least two 
major ways. The first, a judicial response, is the Supreme Court’s renewed 
emphasis on non-statutory exclusions from the domain of patentable subject 
matter for natural laws and abstract ideas, which appears to have resulted in a 
significant reduction in patents issued in areas like software and business 
methods.201 The second, a legislative response, is the expansion of mechanisms 
that permit the USPTO to reconsider and cancel issued patents—chiefly through 
the inter partes review and post-grant review procedures, commonly referred to 
as “IPRs” and “PGRs.”202 Both the expansion of patentable subject-matter 
exclusions and procedures for expanded administrative review of patents can be 
understood as measures that delay the award of patent rights, albeit in different 
ways. Both reforms, however, show signs of a failure to appreciate the larger set 
of concerns and policy tradeoffs relevant to timing the award of IP rights and 
 
199 See, e.g., Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 457, 491 (2012). 
200 See FTC, PATENT ASSERTION ENTITY ACTIVITY: AN FTC STUDY 8-9 (2016) (giving 
statistics showing early settlement in patent suits brought by PAEs). 
201 See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (describing Supreme 
Court’s willingness to understand 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) as having “exclusionary principle”); 
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70 (2012) (“‘[L]aws of 
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas’ are not patentable.” (quoting Diamond v. 
Diehr, 450 U.S. 157, 185 (1981))). 
202 See 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2012) (outlining procedure for IPRs of issued patents); id. § 321 
(outlining procedures for PGRs of issued patents). 
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could be modified to respond to the challenges of early awards while better 
avoiding the drawbacks of later ones. 
The patentable subject-matter exclusions reflect an emphasis on applied uses 
and a concern that principles and knowledge should not be withdrawn from the 
public domain.203 It is not enough to come up with an application of a newly 
discovered scientific principle or a newly created mathematical algorithm if the 
process of adapting those ideas into a practical application is itself purely 
obvious or routine. The Court’s instinct is firmly grounded in basic principles of 
patent law. Patent law is concerned only with practical applications, rather than 
general truths about the world, and should therefore only award protection when 
such an application has been developed.204 Furthermore, a patent on the 
application of such a general truth can sometimes amount to what is in effect a 
patent on a general truth itself, which may frustrate the overall goals of the patent 
system by inhibiting further discovery and innovation.205 The Supreme Court’s 
concern that the patentable subject-matter exclusions not be evaded through 
artful drafting206 is perfectly sound. 
But the reason for those exclusions must be kept in mind. Important 
discoveries about the world are excluded from patent protection in order to 
facilitate further discovery and the development of practical uses thereof. The 
Supreme Court’s announced test for separating the abstract from the practical 
essentially asks how much value and innovation of a particular invention resides 
in the a novel principle’s implementation, as distinguished from the principle 
itself.207 But if the concern is to ensure, on the one hand, that the hunt really is 
completed and, on the other, that others remain free to compete for those prey 
not yet captured, this test misses the mark. Rather than focusing on the relative 
proportions of abstract knowledge versus practical insight in a particular 
invention, it would make more sense to consider the extent to which protection 
for a particular application would in practice amount to protection of the 
 
203 See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 612 (2010) (dismissing patent claim as abstract 
idea). 
204 See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 536 (1966) (stating that “patent system must be 
related to the world of commerce rather than to the realm of philosophy”). 
205 See Mayo Collaborative Servs., 566 U.S. at 86 (“[T]here is a danger that the grant of 
patents that tie up their use will inhibit future innovation premised upon them, a danger that 
becomes acute when a patented process amounts to no more than an instruction to ‘apply the 
natural law,’ or otherwise forecloses more future invention than the underlying discovery 
could reasonably justify.”). 
206 See id. at 72 (“[T]o transform an unpatentable law of nature into a patent-eligible 
application of such a law, one must do more than simply state the law of nature while adding 
the words ‘apply it.’”). 
207 See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014) (describing the 
Supreme Court’s two-step process for determining patent eligibility); Mayo Collaborative 
Servs., 566 U.S. at 82 (denying patent for simply instructing application of known natural 
law). 
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unpatentable principle. So, for example, in Mayo Collaborative Services v. 
Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.,208 a patent essentially reciting certain 
discoveries about human metabolism and only obliquely suggesting anything 
particular be done with those discoveries presents a serious risk that any other 
useful application of the biological facts discovered will infringe the patent, 
including those that do not reflect genuine “improvement[s]” upon it.209 
When a patentee really has developed a useful application of a principle, the 
patent chase ought to be considered over, so far as that application is concerned. 
The real problem lies in the possibility that by claiming a particular specimen, 
the patentee will have de facto rights to a larger genus. Particularly in the context 
of process patents—where most of the mischief is thought to reside—the 
giveaway is usually in the verbs. Where the action that is described or called for 
is vague, there is a serious danger that the patent will cover not simply a 
particular application but a wider array of uses of a more general principle. Mayo 
Collaborative Services involved a patent purporting to claim a method of 
medical treatment, but whose central instruction to those performing it was that 
a specified level of a particular compound present in certain medical patients 
“indicates a need” to increase their drug dosage, while another specified level 
“indicates a need” to decrease it.210 The phrasing was highly abstract; the verb 
referred to the compound itself, rather than to anyone who would carry out the 
method. There was therefore an obvious risk that the patent would apply not to 
a particular way that a fact about human metabolism might be put to use, but to 
a set of essentially unrelated uses of that information. In other words, the 
doctrine governing exclusions of natural laws and abstract ideas should function 
more like the patent equivalent of copyright’s merger doctrine, which bars 
copyright protection when protecting a particular expression of an unprotectable 
idea would effectively wall off any expression of the idea.211 The guiding 
concern ought to be the likelihood that patent protection will tie up general 
research and the development of novel applications unrelated to the particular 
application invented by the patentee. 
While patentable subject-matter exclusions push patentability later in time 
conceptually speaking, IPRs and PGRs push the grant of patent protection later 
in a more practical sense. Although it has always been possible to challenge the 
validity of a patent in actual patent litigation, IPRs and PGRs have significantly 
expanded the ability to oppose patent grants while still in an administrative 
setting. In practice the effect has been to open up the question of validity 
substantially so that, in some sense, it is much more uncertain whether a patent 
 
208 566 U.S. 66 (2012). 
209 See id. at 67-69; see also 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (listing improvement as necessity for 
patent). 
210 Mayo Collaborative Servs., 566 U.S. at 75. 
211 See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1879) (decrying copyright claim for particular 
accounting system using ruled lines as fraud against public). 
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is ever valid. Bad patents are, of course, bad, and weeding them out is 
unobjectionable so far as it goes. As previously stated, early awards risk 
assigning patents to a party that is not able to follow through with a useful 
application. They may reward unhelpful research activity intended to obtain a 
patent whose value derives overwhelmingly from holding up the activities of 
others. But later awards have their costs too—disincentivizing innovation for 
fear of invalidation and duplication of effort. Indeed, with the recent enactment 
of the first, general, federal law of trade secrecy,212 the net effect of these 
changes may be a significant shift of incentives away from public disclosure of 
inventions to their secret practice in some fields. 
2. The Hunt for Secondary Meaning 
Concerns about premature claiming have also resulted in confusion in 
trademark law, particularly as it relates to the doctrine of secondary meaning in 
the making, discussed earlier.213 The now-discarded secondary meaning in the 
making doctrine would have created something like a first-committed-searcher 
rule for descriptive marks. This analysis suggests two conclusions about the 
doctrine. 
First, while rejecting the doctrine was likely the right result, it was reached 
for the wrong reason. In essence, opponents argued that any recognition of 
incipient secondary meaning was “inimical” to the purpose of trademark law.214 
To protect a party that is merely working toward acquiring secondary meaning 
in a mark, it was said, flies in the face of trademark law’s commitment to 
protecting marks only when they were, in fact, marks—devices that distinguish 
one class of products from another. But this overlooks the difference between 
the two modes of establishing possession that we have explored. A first-
committed-searcher rule gives a party who already began the chase priority over 
 
212 See Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376 (codified in 
scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). 
213 See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text. 
214 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1995) 
(“The [secondary meaning in the making] doctrine, if taken literally, is inimical to the purpose 
of the secondary meaning requirement.”); see also Laureyssens v. Idea Grp., Inc., 964 F.2d 
131, 138 (2d Cir. 1992) (“Moreover, ‘[t]he doctrine, if taken literally, is inimical to the 
purpose of the secondary meaning requirement.’” (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1995))); Joel S. Armstrong, Secondary 
Meaning “In the Making” in Trademark Infringement Actions Under Section 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 603, 619 (1992) (“The secondary meaning in the making 
doctrine is therefore rejected as being inimical to the theoretical and economic underpinnings 
of trademark law.”); Willajeanne F. McLean, The Birth, Death, and Renaissance of the 
Doctrine of Secondary Meaning in the Making, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 737, 757 (1993) (“Legal 
scholars opposed to the doctrine of secondary meaning in the making thought that the doctrine 
was generally ‘inimical to the purpose of . . . secondary meaning’ . . . .” (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1995))). 
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later entrants, and possibly some rights against interference, but it need not entail 
full, permanent rights of exclusion without further development of the resource. 
A whaler in hot pursuit of a sperm whale has priority over other whalers, but he 
does not come to own the whale unless the chase is actually completed within a 
fairly compressed timeframe. Indeed, this very fact is evident in trademark law 
itself: while an intent-to-use application secures priority in a mark, no action for 
infringement can be brought until that mark has actually been used in 
commerce.215 The logic of the argument used to defeat legal recognition of 
incipient secondary meaning would essentially deny the possibility of a first-
committed-searcher standard in first possession doctrine. 
Nevertheless, not recognizing a secondary meaning in the making doctrine 
for descriptive marks is justified in our view because of the difficulty courts 
would face defining who is a “committed” searcher. Importantly, there is no 
clear way for a court to set a time limit on a party’s attempt to acquire secondary 
meaning. This problem is less acute for resources like whales. The timeframe at 
issue is relatively short—a few days at most—and the first committed whaler 
must be in hot pursuit, which, though certainly not free from of any ambiguity 
or exercise of judgment, nevertheless has a fairly apparent meaning where 
pursuit is not just a metaphor but a simple physical fact. The process of building 
a brand, by contrast, is much less straightforward. There is no clear timeframe 
in which to complete the process of developing secondary meaning, given 
differences in marketing techniques and strategies, the marketing channels 
appropriate to different products, the structure of the market, and the cross-
section of the consuming public to be targeted. Since it would be difficult for 
courts to develop a standard by which to measure the commitment to following 
through, the secondary meaning in the making doctrine involved the risk of 
granting rights in a mark to a party that would not eventually develop such 
secondary meaning while denying these rights to a rival party who did. 
Second, contrary to what the courts rejecting a secondary meaning in the 
making doctrine supposed, the problem is not one that is somehow conceptually 
intrinsic to trademark law. While courts may not be positioned to initiate such 
changes, the story may be different for Congress. It is possible to adopt a 
possession rule based on a first-committed-searcher model and grant rights 
earlier in the development process if a proper system of registration is 
established in order to provide adequate notice to others. This can be 
accomplished practically only by legislation. Legislation can address the proper 
limitations on such a system—the time window necessary to establish secondary 
meaning and the degree of diligence that must be shown to remain in “hot 
pursuit.” Indeed, intent to use applications represent a legislative intervention 
that has just these features and can be used today by first committed adopters of 
descriptive marks. This institutional innovation provides both the notice to 
 
215 See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2012); 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 
412 (2d Cir. 2005) (clarifying that “use,” “in commerce,” and “likelihood of confusion” are 
three distinct elements necessary for establishing trademark infringement). 
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others about the committed search and a time limit for the completion of the 
hunt. 
B. Institutional Implications 
These reflections on existing doctrine and the general framework this Article 
develops point toward some larger observations about first possession in IP law. 
The analogy to first possession helps us to see the stakes at issue when it comes 
to the rules that determine the award of IP rights, but there are also important 
differences in the way those concerns play out that shed light on the deeper 
structure of both IP law and the first possession mechanism more generally. 
1. Possession, Information, and Intellectual Property 
Recall that first-committed-searcher rules can minimize wasteful duplication 
of effort and mitigate the disincentive effects that could otherwise result because 
of the risk that substantial investments made to claim a resource will be lost if 
someone else wins the contest for it. An effective first-committed-searcher rule 
ends the race when one of the contenders reaches a point where eventual capture 
is likely, and thus saves on what would otherwise be duplicative and wasteful 
simultaneous search and investment efforts in an ongoing race. 
This advantage of the first-committed-searcher rule depends critically on the 
ability to give notice to others that the race has in fact ended, and indeed, on the 
confidence of competitors for a resource that they will be informed when and if 
the race ended.216 With physical resources, it is easy to overlook the importance 
of this precondition. In general, it is relatively easy for one person trying to 
capture or develop a physical resource to learn that someone else is also doing 
the same. In Pierson v. Post, for instance, it appears to have been entirely clear 
to Pierson that Post was chasing the fox.217 Similarly, it would generally be 
apparent to a whaler who happened upon a sperm whale that a rival was already 
in hot pursuit and managed to harpoon it. 
The same cannot be said of intellectual property. Since firms often conduct 
R&D in private—indeed, often in secret—one firm could easily undertake 
extensive work to develop a cure for a given disease or plan an advertising 
campaign centering on a new trademark without knowing that a competitor up 
the street was doing the very same thing.218 Telling the firms that the first 
committed searcher will be protected against later pursuers of the resource does 
 
216 Kitch, supra note 27, at 266 (suggesting that to create efficient system there must be 
communication of information to competing firms at efficient rate, such as publicly recorded 
ownership of patents shortly after discovery). 
217 Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175, 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (“Pierson, well knowing the fox 
was so hunted and pursued, did, in the sight of Post, to prevent his catching the same, kill and 
carry it off.”). 
218 Kitch, supra note 27, at 278 (“Under a regime of trade secrecy, the competitive firm 
might never learn of a competitor’s processes and would not learn of the technology 
incorporated in a new product until it was marketed.”). 
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not do much to reduce duplicative search efforts, for example, if race participants 
cannot figure out if someone else’s search is already underway before choosing 
to embark on it themselves. 
Absent registration, for instance, firms planning to introduce products or 
services under a particular branding scheme face the very real possibility that 
some other business will enter the market ahead of them using a similar set of 
emblems. Preparing to launch is often a very costly investment that involves the 
choice of a mark, the preparation and timing of a pre-launch campaign, and 
potentially inscribing the mark on tens of thousands of items—athletic shoes, 
computers, soda bottles, and so on—in advance of shipment. The risk that these 
efforts would have to be scrapped would be a very serious problem for firms 
contemplating intensive marketing campaigns. While races for physical 
resources governed by a first-committed-searcher rule tend to be conducted 
under conditions of relatively symmetric information that forestalls wasteful 
investment, this is not generally as likely with intellectual property. 
The vital role played by centralized registries in IP law responds to this 
difficulty by offering an independent mechanism to supply notice without 
relying on actions taken in the course of the race alone. In trademark law, the 
creation of intent-to-use applications allows a company to inform all others that 
it is in hot pursuit of a particular branding space.219 And even before intent-to-
use applications were introduced, courts took advantage of ordinary registration 
based on actual use of a mark to address information concerns, interpreting the 
requirement of use in commerce somewhat more leniently for registered marks 
than for unregistered ones. Registered marks still required some degree of use 
in order to prevent firms from grabbing marks without actually doing anything 
productive with them—failure to follow through, in other words.220 But 
registered marks require less use than unregistered marks because registered 
marks gave notice to the world that limited commercial sales did not.221 
Trademark law’s traditional use in commerce requirement is thus justified not 
only as a waste prevention feature, but also on informational grounds. Use in 
commerce puts competitors on notice that the mark is being used. As Judge 
Easterbrook explained in a well-known opinion, registering a mark enables 
parties to negotiate over the mark before one of them unwittingly “commit[s] 
large sums to marketing,” only to discover someone else claimed it first.222 
 
219 See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b)-(d) (describing process for applying for bona fide intent-to-
use trademark). 
220 See Zazu Designs v. L’Oreal, S.A., 979 F.2d 499, 503 (7th Cir. 1992) (“By insisting 
that firms use marks to obtain rights in them, the law prevents entrepreneurs from reserving 
brand names in order to make their rivals’ marketing more costly.”). 
221 Id. (“Registration modifies this system slightly, allowing slight sales plus notice in the 
register to substitute for substantial sales without notice.”). 
222 Id. at 504 (“Liberality in registering marks is not problematic, because the registration 
gives notice to latecomers, which token use alone does not. Firms need only search the register 
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Public sales similarly “let others know that they should not invest resources to 
develop a mark similar to one already used in the trade.”223 Intent-to-use bsaed 
registration carried this model a step further, making it possible to move the 
priority point back even earlier, from slight sales to no sales at all, while at the 
same time requiring that substantial sales follow in relatively short order.224 
Intent-to-use applications overcome the notice problem that is so acute for first-
committed-searcher rules in intellectual property, and thereby enable the law to 
respond more effectively to the problems associated with insisting on actual 
capture. Thus understood, one reason for the common law prevalence of the rule 
of capture versus the first-committed-searcher rule is likely informational: actual 
capture of physical resources is a clear informational signal, in a way “a first 
committed searcher” is not. But once it is possible to give notice to third 
parties—such as through registries—the first-committed-searcher rule becomes 
a more viable alternative.  
A similar dynamic has happened in copyright law under a slightly different 
heading. In certain contexts, creators working to bring a work to the public have 
had to confront a serious risk that the work would be leaked to the public before 
its official release, in effect snatching an important aspect of the work from their 
hands in a manner not unlike the taking of the fox in Pierson v. Post. Until 
relatively recently, that was the case with copyrighted works. The often-critical 
statutory damages remedy was only available if the work infringed was already 
completed and registered with the copyright office. Since registration requires 
deposit of the work, copyright owners could not, practically speaking, register 
until the work was completely finished.225 In the well-known Harper & Row, 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises226 case, for example, the famous 
publishing house was set to release Gerald Ford’s presidential memoir and 
sought to whet the public’s appetite for the book by allowing Time Magazine to 
print a few select excerpts in advance of release.227 Another magazine, however, 
managed to obtain a “purloined copy” of the memoir and rushed to publish the 
juiciest portions, preempting Time’s publication.228 Harper & Row sued and won 
 
before embarking on development. Had ZHD registered ZAZÚ, the parties could have 
negotiated before L’Oréal committed large sums to marketing.”). 
223 Id. at 503. 
224 See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b)-(d) (requiring registrant file verified statement that mark is in 
use in commerce within six months after allowance of intent-to-use application). 
225 17 U.S.C. §§ 407-408 (2012) (requiring owners of copyright to deposit copies of 
protected work within three months after publication of work). Theoretically, copyright 
owners could register versions of a work periodically while they were working on it and thus 
avail themselves of the statutory damages remedy, but this practice would be costly, 
monetarily and organizationally, and not very practical. 
226 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
227 Id. at 539. 
228 Id. at 539-40 (“[P]etitioners, as the copyright holders, negotiated a prepublication 
licensing agreement with Time Magazine under which Time agreed to pay $25,000 ($12,500 
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a judgment of infringement, but the company was ultimately unable to recover 
statutory damages, making its victory rather limited. In another major prerelease 
infringement incident in 2003, a non-final version of the movie “Hulk” leaked 
to the Internet prior to official release, resulting in a harm that the studio claimed 
amounted to sixty-six million dollars.229  
In 2005, following the Hulk incident, Congress amended the Copyright Act 
to add a provision allowing for the preregistration of “works being prepared for 
commercial distribution.”230 Under this new statutory framework, a party who 
has begun the process of generating a creative work can preregister it prior to 
completion, making it possible to recover statutory damages and attorney’s fees 
for any subsequent act of infringement.231 The preregistrant must eventually 
follow up and register the work once published,232 although, surprisingly, the 
Copyright Act does not set a time limit for completing the work and publishing 
it.  
Preregistration gives authors security to complete the chase without 
interruption by substantially increasing the sanctions on the “saucy intruder,” in 
the language of the Pierson v. Post dissent.233 It marks the limited introduction 
of a first-committed-searcher model. Observed patterns of use of copyright 
preregistration claiming are consistent with what the theory developed in this 
Article predicts: early claiming becomes more attractive as the “hunt” becomes 
more expensive, since higher costs are more likely to deter firms concerned 
 
in advance and the balance at publication) in exchange for the right to excerpt 7,500 words 
from Mr. Ford’s account of his pardon of former President Nixon.”). 
229 See Troy Graham, N.J. Man, 24, Is Sentenced for Net Bootleg of ‘The Hulk,’ PHILA. 
INQUIRER, Sept. 27, 2003, at B1 (“Vivendi Universal Entertainment, which produced The 
Hulk, commissioned several studies to determine what Gonzalez’s actions cost the studio. 
While assigning a dollar amount is an inexact science, the studio settled on about $66 million 
in a victim-impact statement to the federal court.”). For another example, see Rebecca Pahle, 
A Brief History of Movies Being Leaked Onto the Internet, FILM JOURNAL (Dec. 5, 2014), 
http://www.filmjournal.com/content/brief-history-movies-being-leaked-internet 
[https://perma.cc/K5MN-5UJC] (illustrating multiple instances of movies being leaked before 
official release). 
230 See 17 U.S.C. § 408(f) (“[T]he Register of Copyrights shall issue regulations to 
establish procedures for preregistration of a work that is being prepared for commercial 
distribution and has not been published.”). 
231 On preregistration, see Dotan Oliar & Nicholas Matich, Copyright Preregistration: 
Evidence and Lessons from the First Seven Years, 2005-2012, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 1073, 1073 
(2013) (“Preregistering a work allows copyright owners immediate access to courts and an 
expanded menu of remedies.”). 
232 See 17 U.S.C. § 408(f)(3) (requiring registration no later than three months after 
publication of work). 
233 Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175, 181 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (Livingston, J., dissenting) (“But 
who would . . . pursue the windings of this wily quadruped, if . . . a saucy intruder, who had 
not shared in the honours or labours of the chase, were permitted to come in at the death, and 
bear away in triumph the object of pursuit?”). 
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about losing their investments if someone else beats them to the punch. Movies 
are generally the most expensive copyrighted works to create, and, 
unsurprisingly, they are the category for which preregistrations is most 
consistently used.234 Again, however, this earlier protection centers on a 
registration regime. 
Copyright preregistration does not yield the first-committed-searcher rule’s 
advantage of deterring a bona fide third party from entering the race, here via 
independent creation. But it does entail another benefit associated with this rule, 
namely assuring (or increasing the assurance of) the first committed searcher 
against a third party’s interference throughout the course of the hunt, while free 
riding on the first pursuer’s effort. True, in this context there is no danger that a 
third party will own the copyright rather than the creator, as the third party is an 
infringer and the owner’s formal copyright is not in danger. However, it is of 
little consequence to the copyright owner by which mechanism the value of her 
investment went to zero. She wishes to secure the fruits of her investment, and 
the enhanced remedies that preregistration confers tend to do so, thus 
maintaining her incentives to make costly investments.  
The relationship between notice considerations and the timing of exclusive 
rights is perhaps most apparent in the patent context. Although U.S. patent law 
followed a first-committed-searcher model until enactment of the AIA, its ability 
to shore up incentives to innovate and discourage waste in the development 
process was undercut by informational barriers. To return once again to the 
situation described in Figure 3, the pre-AIA regime tended to encourage both 
Tesla and Edison to carry out the entire inventive process, even though the 
priority rules followed a first-committed-searcher model. Unless Tesla had some 
way of knowing that Edison came up with the idea first and was diligently 
attempting to see it through to its conclusion, Tesla would often see no reason 
not to carry out the entire inventive process simultaneously to its end, only to 
discover that he was actually the second pursuer. Such surprise would not arise 
in first-committed-searcher rule races over physical resources: any onlooker 
would readily see whether a sperm whale is at large or is rather being hotly 
pursued. 
One may wonder how such a seemingly inefficient aspect of our patent system 
survived for so long? It turns out that for a good part of the nineteenth century, 
starting with the Patent Act of 1836, patent doctrine had a mechanism that helped 
inventors receive timely notice of others’ pursuits. By filing a so-called “patent 
caveat,” inventors were entitled to receive notice from the patent office 
whenever a rival inventor filed a patent application for inventions that were 
 
234 See Oliar & Matich, supra note 231, at 1100 (“The film industry is both the industry 
most likely to benefit from preregistration and the system’s most consistent commercial 
user.”). 
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similar to those the caveat filer was working on.235 Caveats were eventually 
abolished in 1910, and without them a first-to-invent patent system makes less 
sense. In their absence, a first-to-file system, such as the AIA, is preferable on 
notice grounds. The touchstone of priority under the AIA is disclosure, whether 
by filing with the patent office or by making the invention or information about 
it available to the public in a context where someone having skill in the relevant 
art might be likely to look.236 To that extent, the AIA makes a good deal of sense. 
2. Intellectual Property as Property: Flexibility and Standardization 
With the AIA, patent law adopted an actual capture rule to govern the award 
of exclusive rights, thereby coming into alignment with the general approach 
taken in copyright and trademark law. But since not all whales are subject to the 
same rule of first possession,237 we might well ask whether one rule should apply 
uniformly across either patent law or IP law more widely. 
The fact that our patent system has—or had—mechanisms that awarded the 
right to the first committed searcher makes sense in light of the theory of 
possession developed here. Patents are very often extremely expensive to 
acquire in a way copyrights by and large are not.238 The pharmaceutical 
company Amgen spends an average of $3.7 billion on R&D for every drug that 
it has approved; AstraZeneca spends more than four times as much.239 The 
likelihood that these investments will be lost is also higher. The probability of 
two inventors discovering the same technology is higher than the probability of 
 
235 See John F. Duffy, Embryonic Inventions and Embryonic Patents: Prospects, 
Prophesies, and Pedis Possessio, in PERSPECTIVES ON COMMERCIALIZING INNOVATION 234, 
263-64 (F. Scott Kieff & Troy A. Paredes eds., 2011) (“By filing a caveat, a party was entitled 
to notice from the Patent Office if any other party filed a patent application on the same subject 
matter described in the caveat.”). 
236 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012) (detailing disclosure requirements of patent application); 
see also id. § 102(b)(1)(A) (providing priority through grace period exceptions for disclosures 
by applicant or third party who received disclosed information from applicant). 
237 Compare Ellickson, supra note 45, at 90-94 (describing “iron-holds-the-whale” rule 
wherein whale is owned by first party to attach harpoon to whale), with Swift v. Gifford, 23 
F. Cas. 558, 559-60 (D. Mass. 1872) (comparing different standards for rule of capture of 
whales generally with that of the sperm whale species). 
238 The cost of producing copyrighted works is not as obvious as it might seem. Subject to 
certain caveats, across-the-board increases in the compensation to producers of creative works 
should in principle always result in greater creative output, though the costs, including both 
access and opportunity costs, may not be worth it. 
239 See DiMasi, supra note 131, at 151 (“The estimated average out-of-pocket cost per new 
drug is US$ 403 million (2000 dollars).”); Matthew Herper, The Truly Staggering Cost of 
Inventing New Drugs, FORBES MAGAZINE (Feb. 10, 2012, 7:41 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2012/02/10/the-truly-staggering-cost-of-
inventing-new-drugs/#704dda74a948 [https://perma.cc/E85P-BBE7] (presenting research 
spending per new drug for several major pharmaceutical companies). 
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two creators generating the same creative work, since the inventive solution is 
dictated and constrained by real-world functional considerations. It seems far 
more probable that two firms would both invent acetylsalicylic acid (aspirin) 
than that two painters would both paint Starry Night. 
Inventors also face a more serious threat from products and ideas similar to 
their own. Consumers will often be indifferent as between two technologies that 
do the same thing by different means, treating one as a substitute for the other. 
If George decides to purchase a gas stove for his kitchen, he is unlikely to 
purchase an electric stove too; if he takes Zocor to reduce his cholesterol, he is 
unlikely to take Lipitor as well. By contrast, demand for creative works is less 
likely to be mutually exclusive. A person might want to see all the superhero 
movies Hollywood can produce in a year. Indeed, rather than suppress demand, 
one superhero movie may stimulate demand for others. 
For all these reasons, we would generally expect inventors to need greater 
protection from competitors during the process of generating their intellectual 
goods than creators of artistic works. Simply put, developing new 
pharmaceuticals often costs hundreds of millions of dollars,240 and firms will 
often be reluctant to proceed unless they have sufficient confidence they will 
reap the rewards if those investments do indeed produce results.241 In copyright, 
ownership and priority are generally determined by the moment of capture, 
fixation of particular expression in a physical copy.242 Translating to the 
terminology of patent law, this is essentially the point where creative 
abstractions are reduced to actual practice. On average, the costs of copyrighted 
works are less than those of patents, and the claiming moment is later, as the 
theory this Article proposes would suggest. 
Yet not all patents and not all copyrights are alike. While some patents are 
extremely expensive to procure, not all of them are so. And some creative 
works—think of Hollywood blockbusters—require huge investments. There can 
be substantial variability in costs across different kinds of IP products, and some 
patents may look more like the typical copyright, and some copyrights like the 
more investment-intensive patents. Software or business method patents are 
probably less costly to come up with than the average pharmaceutical patent. 
Movies or software are more expensive to produce than the average haiku.  
That not all whales are alike, and that different ones are subject to different 
doctrines of first possession, suggests that perhaps a degree of differentiation 
 
240 See DiMasi, supra note 131, at 151 (“Capitalizing out-of-pocket costs to the point of 
marketing approval at a real discount rate of 11% yields a total pre-approval cost estimate of 
US$ 802 million (2000 dollars).”); Herper, supra note 239 (“The average drug developed by 
a major pharmaceutical company costs at least $4 billion, and it can be as much as $11 
billion.”). 
241 See Duffy, supra note 15, at 469-75 (providing numerical calculations to show when 
theoretical firms may refrain from investment due to uncertain return). 
242 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2012) (“Copyright in a work . . . subsists from its creation 
and . . . endures for a term consisting of the life of the author and 70 years after the author’s 
death.”). 
  
2019] RIGHT ON TIME 453 
 
may be appropriate also with respect to particular doctrines that govern the 
claiming of any one type of IP right. Given that the greater levels of investment 
offer more reason to adopt early claiming, the balance of considerations may 
come out differently in different areas within patent, copyright, and trademark 
law. Some differentiation can be accommodated within existing doctrinal 
frameworks simply by providing an alternative route for earlier claiming in cases 
where the chase is costly or protracted, as with trademark intent-to-use 
applications and copyright preregistration. But, subject to concerns about 
administrability and any costs of diminished standardization, the law should 
probably go further. It is unclear, for instance, that a first-to-file rule is superior 
to first-to-invent across all patent types as a matter of first best.243 In contexts 
like pharmaceuticals with high upfront development costs, earlier claiming 
should be offered. Conversely, in areas where the danger of squatting or 
misallocation is especially significant—as is likely the case with many business 
method patents for instance—the award of rights should generally be delayed. 
Admittedly, courts generally cannot simply propound different doctrines for 
different subject-matters within the same branch of IP law. Often, such changes 
can only be brought about legislatively. But this discussion of the treatment of 
possession questions both for physical and intellectual property suggests there 
is room for courts to consider ways in which the claiming of IP rights can be 
more closely tailored to incorporate the concerns identified here. When the 
USPTO or a trial court evaluates whether a patent satisfies the utility 
requirement, for instance, the cost of developing the type of invention at issue is 
an appropriate consideration. Insofar as the utility requirement shapes the nature 
of possession in patent law, it should reflect the underlying nature of possession 
rules and tilt toward later awards of rights when the costs of developing a 
technology are low and earlier awards of rights when the cost of developing a 
technology are high. 
C. Theoretical Implications  
1. On Defining IP Goods 
This discussion of claiming rules is, for the most part, absolute. We assumed 
that there was one clear rule for the “capture” of IP rights and, by extension, a 
relatively clear sense of when the chase was underway that would culminate in 
capture. This intuition stems from our physical property antecedents. Whatever 
room for debate there may be at the margins, it is fairly obvious when a person 
does and does not succeed in capturing a fox. We certainly have a pretty good 
idea what a fox is, and a good intuition about what it means to actually capture 
a fox versus merely to chase it. But IP law helps us see that these notions can be 
situated within a wider continuum of development. What ultimately looks like 
 
243 For these purposes, we set aside the benefits of international harmonization, which may 
outweigh the value of any departure from a first-to-file regime. 
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actual capture, as opposed to simply some important step along the way, is a 
function of how the legal system defines the thing to be captured. In IP law, the 
nature of the thing itself is not given but is a creature of law. The result is both 
greater uncertainty and greater flexibility.244 Intellectual property shows that the 
terms “committed search” or “actual capture” are not inevitable names for 
concrete moments in a resource’s chase chronology, but rather mere names for 
early or late points in time along that chronology, and that it is possible for the 
legal system to work with more than just two points along this continuum. 
For example, since 1976, a creative work has been protected by federal 
copyright law as soon as it is fixed in a physical copy and need not also be 
published, as prior federal copyright statutes required.245 If we think of the 
Copyright Act as a system that protects physical embodiments of completed 
works, using fixation to define possession looks like a rule of capture. If, 
however, we think of federal copyright law as a system centered on publication, 
granting copyrights based on fixation looks less like a rule of capture and more 
like a first-committed-searcher rule. In trademark law, similarly, use in 
commerce looks like a rule of capture if trademark law is conceived as simply 
the creation of a brand name, but it looks like a first-committed-searcher rule if 
we think the ultimate object of trademark law is a successful, well known, and 
highly valued mark, like the famous marks protected against dilution. 
In IP law, more is up for grabs than with physical property. The “things” of 
IP law used to organize IP rights are more variable than those of physical 
property.246 This is part of what compounds the difficulties of notice and clear 
conceptual thinking in intellectual property, which can be ameliorated somewhat 
through devices like rights registries. But it also provides for greater flexibility 
and tailoring, helping to facilitate the sometimes sliding-scale quality of IP 
protection. Trademarks receive some protection upon the registration of mere 
intent to use. Then greater protection is given after use in commerce is shown 
and, where required, the acquisition of secondary meaning, but more protection 
 
244 Cf. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 
675 (1999) (considering but rejecting various candidates for “property” created by Lanham 
Act false advertising provisions). 
245 See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (creating copyright in work at time of creation). Common law 
principles offered some protection for unpublished works under state law. See Stanley v. 
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 221 P.2d 73, 78 (Cal. 1950) (en banc) (“[C]ommon law prohibits 
any kind of unauthorized interference with, or use of, an unpublished work on the ground of 
an exclusive property right, and the common-law right . . . exist[s] until lost or terminated by 
the voluntary act of the owner . . . .”). 
246 See Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in 
Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1755 (2007) (“‘Invention space’ and original expressions 
do not come pre-carved into things. That is, we are implicitly treating an invention as a thing 
when the interest in its use—the various activities—are described at a high level of generality 
not tied directly to the activity itself.”). 
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if they are “strong” and still more if they are “famous.”247 Copyright functions 
more obviously like a system of temporal priority for works that are widely 
circulated since copying is more easily shown when a work is well known.248 
Patent law, too, has doctrines that afford greater protection to inventions that are 
more developed. For instance, while commercialization is not required for a 
patent to issue, commercial success is an important factor in analyzing whether 
a patent satisfies the all-important requirement of non-obviousness.249 Likewise, 
pioneer patents generally receive stronger protection than those covering 
improvements.250 
In the final analysis, IP law itself can be characterized as a kind of first-
committed-searcher rule writ large, at least where the rights at issue are 
understood as essentially commercial in character. Patents and copyrights grant 
inventors and authors a head start over others in capturing market share and 
building customer goodwill. This is no small thing—indeed, it is one of the 
ironies of IP law that a patent-holder’s commercial success can be so complete 
that it results in the destruction of its trademark rights by causing the patent-
holder’s trademark to become generic.251 And trademark law itself even more 
clearly aligns with this conception of intellectual property as a kind of limited 
protection in the process of acquiring property through actual commercial 
exchange. Trademark law requires active use of a mark,252 renewal of 
registration,253 and the ongoing payment of fees.254 Though trademark law is not 
 
247 See, e.g., AMF, Inc., v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 349 (9th Cir. 1979) (setting 
forth test for trademark infringement in which infringement depends, inter alia, on strength of 
mark). 
248 See supra notes 163-67 and accompanying text (describing trademark dilution 
protection requiring widespread brand recognition). 
249 See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966) (noting commercial success 
as “indicia of obviousness or nonobviousness”); MPEP § 2141(II) (9th ed. Rev. 3, Jan. 2018) 
(noting that examiners should consider secondary considerations put forth in Graham v. John 
Deere including “commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, [and] failure of others”). 
250 See Wright Co. v. Herring-Curtiss Co., 211 F. 654, 655 (2d Cir. 1914) (endorsing Judge 
Learned Hand’s lower court reasoning giving liberal interpretation for pioneering inventions). 
251 See, e.g., Murphy Door Bed Co. v. Interior Sleep Sys., Inc., 874 F.2d 95, 97 (2d Cir. 
1989) (“We hold that ‘Murphy bed’ is a generic term, having been appropriated by the public 
to designate generally a type of bed. Consequently, defendants could not have infringed on 
plaintiff’s trademark alleged to be Murphy bed . . . .”). 
252 Abandonment is presumed after three years of non-use. See Lanham Act § 45, 15 
U.S.C. § 1127 (2012). 
253 See id. § 1059(a) (“[E]ach registration may be renewed for periods of 10 years at the 
end of each successive 10-year period following the date of registration upon payment of the 
prescribed fee and the filing of a written application, in such form as may be prescribed by 
the Director.”). 
254 See id.; U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, FEE SCHEDULE (2018), 
https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/fees-and-payment/uspto-fee-
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subject to fixed terms of duration in the manner of patent and copyright law, it 
is even more clearly limited by a kind of hot pursuit requirement. Its origins in 
unfair competition law illustrate its core purpose—to secure to a firm that has 
managed to establish goodwill in the mind of a consumer an exclusive right to 
capitalize upon it, in a quest for the ultimate good to be captured: the consumer’s 
business.255 
2. Divided Possession Rules   
The first possession discussion in the literature has often been conducted 
under an implicit assumption that largely identical pursuers will race to own a 
resource, and that the only task left for the law is to determine the optimal timing 
of possession. While true in many contexts, sometimes efficiency dictates the 
division of labor among two or more pursuers, where each is uniquely positioned 
to conduct one crucial phase in the resource’s hunt or development. In such 
cases, a different type of original acquisition rule might be called for, one which 
would coordinate the actions of several unrelated pursuers, incentivizing each to 
conduct one crucial step along the pursuit’s chronology.  
Indeed, Ellickson’s seminal treatment of whalers’ norms discusses, if at lesser 
extent, a rule of this sort in fisheries where the value of a whale’s carcass would 
be “split between the first harpooner and the ultimate seizer,” in some cases on 
a fifty/fifty basis. The efficiency rationale suggested to support this rule was one 
of division of labor: this rule would incentivize the first harpooner to meet a 
school of whales (characteristic to those fisheries) to focus on striking as many 
of them as quickly as possible before they dissipated, while, at the same time, 
incentivizing other whalers to chase and capture the many dissipating 
encumbered whales.256 This rule would arguably result in a greater yield than 
either the first-committed-searcher rule or the rule of capture, which would focus 
the first whaler’s attention on completing the hunt of one whale at a time, start 
to finish.  
The possiblity of divided awards is not foreign to IP law. Most notably, the 
notion of “blocking patents” in patent law can be thought of as splitting rights 
over a larger inventive space between a first-generation inventor and a follow-
on improver. Each obtains a right to control aspects of the improved invention, 
such that both need to come to terms in order for the improvement to be used. 
The doctrine incentivizes each to perform important tasks in the invention 
 
schedule#TM%20Process%20Fee [https://perma.cc/P4TW-XHLZ] (defining various fees for 
trademark processing at the USPTO, including trademark renewal fees). 
255 See McKenna, supra note 168, at 1840-41 (“[T]rademark law was not traditionally 
intended to protect consumers. Instead, trademark law, like all unfair competition law, sought 
to protect producers from illegitimate diversions of their trade by competitors.”). 
256 See Ellickson, supra note 45, at 92-93. 
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chronology that they are uniquely capable of performing.257 Abstracting away 
from particular detail, property and IP doctrine can form original acquisition 
rules that create entitlements, which are in some sense shared among several 
parties in ways that induce them to move cooperatively along the chronology of 
a resource’s pursuit and development. 
One may wonder why explicit reliance on divided entitlements is not 
undertaken more widely in IP law. Part of the reason may have to do with the 
difficulty of obtaining the information needed to assess relative contributions of 
different parties and their unique capabilities in various settings. One can also 
view patent and copyright laws’ limited duration—a feature absent from 
common-law property—as a primary mechanism to coordinate between 
different generations of authors and inventors, incentivizing each to come forth 
with their unique contributions to the advancement of the arts and sciences.  
CONCLUSION 
Long before the legal academy became interested in whaling norms, Herman 
Melville took up the subject of first possession, devoting an entire chapter of 
Moby-Dick to the fast-fish/loose-fish doctrine.258 The world, Melville 
concluded, is full of fast-fish—of people and places captured and controlled by 
others. Yet, he continued, even more plentiful are the world’s loose fish—all 
those materials as yet free but available for the taking by whomever can capture 
them first. He asked, “What are men’s minds and opinions but Loose-Fish?”259 
“What is the great globe itself but a Loose-Fish? And what are you, reader, but 
a Loose-Fish and a Fast-Fish, too?”260 
Ultimately, possession is not about mere law any more than Moby-Dick is 
about mere whales, especially when it comes to intellectual property. Once a 
relatively obscure set of fairly technical disciplines, Intellectual property has 
proliferated over the last century to occupy a central position in the law, both 
within the United States and globally. Its domain is human ingenuity and the 
substratum of much contemporary life—technology, communication, 
entertainment, and commerce. What chunks of these are free for capture, and 
what it takes to capture them, are critical in determining the direction and 
composition of society. These grand themes, however, still depend on the 
particulars of legal doctrine and the conceptual framework that shapes and is 
shaped by them. The sound development of intellectual property’s possessory 
doctrines requires careful attention to detail and a systematic understanding of 
 
257 See Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case 
of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75, 81 (1994) (“Blocking patents thus represent an 
interesting property rights institution that balances incentives for pioneers with incentives for 
independent inventors to push pioneering technology forward.”). 
258 See MELVILLE, supra note 46, at 329. 
259 Id. at 1219. 
260 Id. 
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the considerations that are at play. Simply put, we cannot get it right if we do 
not understand what is going on. 
This Article set forth an account of the central features that drive first 
possession in the law, describing both the forms first possession rules take and 
the functions different approaches perform. IP law is subject to the same basic 
set of trade-offs that shape traditional first possession doctrines—particularly 
the danger of failure to complete the chase, on the one hand, and the risk of 
wasteful duplication and reluctance to compete due to fear of lost investments, 
on the other. At the same time, however, the balance between these concerns 
differs in important respects, as do the institutional possibilities IP law affords. 
Intellectual property faces particularly acute problems of asymmetric 
information, but it also allows for greater flexibility through the use of 
centralized registries and a wider array of possibilities in defining the “things” 
that can be protected. In some ways, the law sensibly responds to these 
differences between the tangible and the intangible, but often imperfectly and 
without a clear understanding of the underlying stakes. By confronting these 
issues in a systematic and integrated way, this Article set out a useful platform 
from which to survey the wider horizon of intellectual property and better chart 
the course that lies ahead. The need for a clear grasp of the fundamentals will 
prove critical in the decades to come, for intellectual property is still in its 
relative infancy and if, as Melville might say, it is in some respects a fast-fish, 
but in others it is very much a loose-fish too.  
 
